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One Size Does Not Fit All: A Framework for 
Tailoring Intellectual Property Rights 
MICHAEL W. CARROLL* 
The United States and its trading partners have adopted cultural and 
innovation policies under which the government grants one-size-fits-all 
patents and copyrights to inventors and authors. On a global basis, the 
reasons for doing so vary, but in the United States granting intellectual 
property rights has been justified as the principal means of promoting 
innovation and cultural progress. Until recently, however, few have 
questioned the wisdom of using such blunt policy instruments to promote 
progress in a wide range of industries in which the economics of innovation 
varies considerably.  
Provisionally accepting the assumptions of the traditional economic case 
for intellectual property, this Article scrutinizes the presumption of 
uniformity in patent and copyright law and makes three contributions. First, 
it suggests three overarching metrics policymakers should use when 
choosing among innovation-related policies: (1) the government’s 
comparative ability to direct resources toward innovation likely to lead to 
success; (2) the policy’s “administrability;” and (3) the questions of 
political economy likely to effect a policy’s success. From this analysis, the 
case for intellectual property rights emerges as a second-best solution 
based on the uncertainty of innovation and the comparatively better 
information possessed by private innovators.  
Second, this Article shows that these same three metrics supply the case for 
uniform intellectual property rights within the distinct domains of patent 
and copyright law as a default initial domestic policy. Third, intellectual 
property law is part of a dynamic system, and information obtained over 
time will support proposals to tailor patents and copyrights to improve their 
performance as innovation policy. Indeed, the distinction between patent 
and copyright law is a form of high-level tailoring, and in addition patent 
and copyright law each has been tailored in a number of ways by Congress, 
the federal courts, and administrative agencies. Intellectual property 
                                                                                                                   
* Professor of Law and Director, Program on Information Justice and Intellectual 
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scholarship lacks a framework for assessing existing and proposed tailoring 
measures. This Article proposes such a framework derived from the logic of 
the traditional economic case for intellectual property. This framework 
applies to a wide range of pending policy questions, such as whether, or to 
what extent, software, business methods, tax shelters, or living organisms 
should be patentable and whether, or to what extent, statutory licenses 
should be granted for certain types of copyrighted works or for certain 
types of use, and whether fashion design should receive sui generis 
protection. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The legal literature concerning intellectual property rights has grown in 
recent years to advance our understanding of the history of copyright law and 
the patent system, the economic functions of patents and copyrights, and the 
conceptual frameworks used by courts, legislatures, and the general public to 
understand intellectual property. It is generally accepted that the government 
grants patents to inventors and copyrights to authors to promote innovation 
and the development of culture and education.1 Nonetheless, two yawning 
gaps remain in the analysis of intellectual property as a means to achieve 
innovative and creative ends.  
First, when and why grant intellectual property rights? Granting 
exclusive rights is only one of a number of options available to stimulate 
investments in innovation and cultural production. Direct investments 
through grant awards is another.2 There is no generally accepted 
framework—even within the subdiscipline(s) of economic analysis of law—
for assessing the trade-offs between granting intellectual property rights, 
investing public funds directly in innovation through grants or prizes or 
indirectly through tax policy, or some combination of these to encourage 
desired levels of inventive and creative activity.3 
Second, to the extent that there is good reason to rely on the intellectual 
property rights strategy, why tailor rights by distinguishing patents, 
copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets but then grant patents and 
copyrights as usually one-size-fits-all bundles of rights when these rights 
impose significant social costs and the inventors and authors who receive 
 
1 See infra notes 16–21 & accompanying text (discussing the policy goals for 
intellectual property rights). 
2 See, e.g., Omnibus Appropriations Act, H.R. 1105, 111th Cong. (2009) (increasing 
budgets for scientific research through the National Institutes of Health and the National 
Science Foundation by billions of dollars). 
3 Some commentators have addressed the question and made important 
contributions, but these have not led to a fully developed policy framework. See Nancy 
Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive 
System?, in 2 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 51, 53, 71 (Adam Jaffe, Joshua 
Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2002) (sketching in the beginning of such analysis); Joseph E. 
Stiglitz, Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights, 57 DUKE L.J. 1693, 
1712–24 (2008) (same). 
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these rights are quite differently situated?4 Indeed, the problem of 
“uniformity cost”—the social cost attributable to the lack of fit between our 
innovation goals and the blunt means of one-size-fits-all patents and 
copyrights—is at the heart of most contemporary problems with intellectual 
property law.  
The concept of uniformity cost is somewhat abstract, but it is central to 
understanding the economics of intellectual property. Uniformity cost is 
analogous to the more familiar economic concept of opportunity cost—the 
cost, say, of giving up option A in favor of option B.5 Patent and copyright 
law define the range of options or opportunities that inventors and authors on 
one side, and members of the public on the other, may legally act on with 
respect to certain forms of information, such as a narrative or the formula for 
manufacturing a pharmaceutical compound. When choosing whether to 
assign an information entitlement to inventors/authors or the general public, 
intellectual property policymakers must take into account, to the extent 
feasible, the foregone outcomes that result from this choice. One-size-fits-all 
patents and copyrights effectively bundle a large range of potential uses and 
make the assignment of information entitlements a decision about assigning 
very large bundles of activities to one side or the other.  
Uniformity cost is the social cost that arises when a particular use has 
been assigned to the party who is less able to make a socially productive use 
of the opportunity. In the worst case, the mistaken assignment empowers the 
entitlement holder to thwart a range of potentially productive activities—
whether that is because the assignment to the public scares away capital 
investment necessary to further develop valuable information or because the 
assignment of a property right undercuts the productive capacity of a range 
of innovators or creators in the general public. 
While the term “uniformity cost” is of relatively recent vintage, the 
problem it describes is not new, and the law already deploys a range of 
strategies to mitigate uniformity cost. Tailoring rights is one such strategy. 
However, while patent and copyright law already have been tailored in a 
number of respects, scholars have not developed a general framework for 
assessing whether these tailoring measures reflect successful rent seeking, 
successful fine tuning, or both.6 
This Article analyzes the gaps in the standard economic case for granting 
intellectual property rights in general and uniform intellectual rights in 
particular and articulates an evidence-based framework for refining the 
 
4 See infra Part III (discussing the costs of uniform rights). 
5 Thanks to Brett Frischmann for this insight. 
6 See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: 
A Quiet Revolution, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 17 (2003) (advancing a formal model 
showing the trade-offs). 
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intellectual property rights strategy and for recognizing when alternative 
policies would be preferable to intellectual property. For purposes of this 
Article, I provisionally confine the analysis to the frame imposed by 
traditional welfare economics, as modified by the new institutional 
economics, which together dominate the law-and-economics literature on 
intellectual property. The argument for the tailoring framework emerges as a 
logical extension of this approach to the field. However, periodically, I point 
out in text or in the notes certain limitations on, or difficulties with, using this 
form of economic analysis to support policies aimed at welfare 
maximization. 
With this proviso in mind, the Article argues that three general criteria 
should frame the comparative analysis of granting intellectual property rights 
and other policy options. First, policymakers should assess the relative 
abilities of government officials and potential authors, inventors and their 
financial backers, to predict innovative success, recognizing that “success” is 
a value-laden objective and that investments in technological and cultural 
progress are uncertain however success is measured.7 Second, they should 
assess the “administrability” of a proposed policy option. This criterion 
combines assessments of relative administrative cost and robustness against 
attempts to game the system.8 Finally, considerations of political economy 
should be given due weight. Theoretical models of innovation policy trade-
offs have their place, but the historical concentration of innovative and 
creative production in certain industries has given these industries certain 
forms of influence with public officials that must be acknowledged when 
fashioning policy that is supposed to do real and important work in the real 
world.9 
On the question of reducing uniformity cost, this Article argues that 
much more work needs to be done, and it proposes an analytical framework 
to guide this future work. Currently, economic analysts of intellectual 
property rights seem resigned to accept the intractability of certain problems 
posed by unitary patent and copyright systems, a sense best captured by 
Professor Clarisa Long: “The same might be said of a unitary patent system 
that Winston Churchill famously said about democracy: It’s the worst form 
of patent system, except for all the others that have been tried.”10  
Respectfully, I disagree. As a descriptive matter, neither patent law nor 
copyright law is entirely unitary. At its most extreme, statutory law has been 
 
7 See infra note 51 & accompanying text (discussing uncertainty). 
8 See infra Section V.B (discussing administrability). 
9 See infra Section II.C (discussing political economy). 
10 Clarisa Long, Our Uniform Patent System, 55 FED. LAW. 44, 49 (2008) 
[hereinafter Long, Uniform Patent System]. 
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tailored to extend sui generis exclusive rights to inventions of new plants, 
plant varieties, certain designs, semi-conductor chip masks, and boat hull 
plug molds.11 As of this writing, certain fashion designers are lobbying to 
add fashion design to this list of intellectual property misfits.12 Less extreme 
are the multiple measures through which Congress has augmented or 
diminished rights under patent and copyright law with respect to inventions 
such as pharmaceutical drugs, inventions arising from federally-funded 
research, and works of authorship in music, architecture, and software, to 
name a few.13 Current writing about intellectual property strives to 
marginalize these measures, and, as Professor Joseph Liu has recognized 
with respect to copyright law, as a result analysis of tailored intellectual 
property rights is undertheorized.14  
As a normative matter, intellectual property rights should be tailored to 
reduce uniformity cost. While there are less direct strategies—deploying real 
options and flexible standards that render formally defined uniform rights 
more pliable in application15—these are not a complete answer to the 
problem of uniformity cost. Tailoring will sometimes be the only solution. 
The catch is that tailoring intellectual property rights well is not easily done. 
The practical obstacles are substantial, and it is for this reason that the 
conceptual frames of unitary patent and copyright systems dominate the 
literature. But the distinction between patent and copyright is itself a form of 
tailored protection, and within the domains of each branch of these forms of 
intellectual property, rights have been tailored before and will be tailored 
again. It is time to have a framework for analyzing this activity and to 
recognize its potential value in rendering intellectual property rights better 
suited to their task(s). 
Proposing such a framework is the principal goal of this Article, and here 
is the roadmap for how the analysis proceeds. Section II shows how three 
considerations—information asymmetries, administrability concerns, and 
questions of political economy—explain the dominance of intellectual 
property rights as the primary innovation and cultural policy in the United 
States. Section III shows that these same considerations explain the default to 
 
11 See Michael W. Carroll, The Law of Tailoring in Intellectual Property (June 24, 
2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Carroll, Law of 
Tailoring] (describing each of these tailored provisions). 
12 See infra note 256 & accompanying text (discussing the Design Piracy Act). 
13 See Carroll, Law of Tailoring, supra note 11. 
14 See generally Joseph Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 105–06 
(2004) (discussing industry-specific provisions of the Copyright Act). 
15 See Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in 
Intellectual Property Law, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 845, 857–61 (2006) [hereinafter Carroll, 
One for All]. 
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uniform patents and copyrights as an initial matter. Section IV shows, 
however, that Congress, the federal courts, the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (“PTO”) and the Copyright Office have each tailored 
rights granted by patent and copyright law to some degree. Finally, Section V 
delivers the proposed framework for gathering and assessing evidence of 
uniformity cost and deciding whether a tailoring response is desirable and 
feasible. 
II. WHY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY? 
The standard economic case for patent and copyright law is quite 
familiar. This Section recites only those aspects relevant to the debate 
concerning uniform and tailored rights. This Section also calls attention to 
often overlooked dimensions of the case for intellectual property regarding 
its history, and the respective roles of comparative administrative costs and 
considerations of political economy. 
The general case for intellectual property starts with the problem. In a 
competitive economy, we should expect underinvestment in creative and 
inventive endeavors without some form of government assistance. Once an 
author, inventor, or their respective financial backers has paid for the creation 
of a valuable creative or innovative work, competitors can reproduce and 
distribute that work at prices too low for those who invested in the creation to 
recoup their investments.16 
The standard economic solution to this public goods or appropriability 
problem17 is government action. In the United States, the Constitution grants 
Congress a range of powers from which it may fashion solutions. First, 
Congress has power “[t]o promote the progress of science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their Respective Writings and discoveries.”18 The idea is simple enough. 
Copyrights and patents are bundles of rights designed to stimulate 
investments in the activities that drive progress by excluding direct 
 
16 See, e.g., Peter S. Menell & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property, in 2 
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1474, 1476 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell 
eds., 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=741424# 
Paper Download.  
17 Some commentators argue that the public goods model maps poorly to works of 
authorship. See Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Public Good Economics: A 
Misunderstood Relation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 693–703 (2008) (arguing that potential 
for spatial competition alters analysis of the appropriability problem but maintaining 
fealty to uniform copyright for some of the reasons set forth in Part III infra); Glynn S. 
Lunney, Jr., Copyright, Private Copying, and Discrete Public Goods, 12 TUL. L. J. TECH. 
& INTELL PROP. (forthcoming 2009).  
18 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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competition with the rightsholder in the marketplace. The owner of such 
rights will enjoy the reward of monopoly pricing if there is sufficient demand 
in the market for the underlying innovation.19  
These rights must be limited, however. While solving one problem, 
intellectual property rights create another by supplying rightsholders with 
powerful weapons against end-users, direct competitors and follow-on 
innovators who seek to bring socially beneficial innovations to market.20 To 
promote progress, intellectual property law must strike a balance, providing 
sufficient incentives for innovation without unduly stifling the efforts of 
follow-on innovators or the liberties of end-users. While many proponents of 
intellectual property rights treat this move from problem to property as 
automatic, it is not.21 Administering an intellectual property regime is 
socially costly, and the intellectual property strategy is merely one option 
that policymakers may deploy to encourage investments in creation and 
invention in the face of competition. 
The second power from which Congress can craft a solution to the 
appropriability problem is “to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and 
Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common defence and general 
Welfare of the United States.”22 It is fair to assume a correlation between the 
“promotion of progress” and “provision of the general welfare,” and thus 
these two powers create in effect two currencies that government may use to 
spur innovation—exclusive rights, which provide an indirect subsidy through 
the promise of potential monopoly profits, indirect subsidies through tax 
expenditure or market regulation through other tax policies, or direct 
spending on innovation either through direct employment or through a 
system of grants, rewards or prizes for creators and inventors. 
Third, Congress has power to “regulate commerce with foreign nations, 
and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.”23 This power 
enables direct regulation of markets for information or for information-
intensive goods—such as new drugs24—and for less direct regulation 
 
19 See, e.g., Menell & Scotchmer, supra note 16, at 1476–77. 
20 See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. 
L. REV. 1031, 1058–59 (2005) [hereinafter Lemley, Free Riding] (tallying the social costs 
of intellectual property rights).  
21 See Menell & Scotchmer, supra note 16, at 1477 (“Whereas the earlier economics 
literature proceeded as if intellectual property protection was the self-evident solution to 
the incentive problem, a more recent literature . . . has tried to understand when that is 
true, and when other incentive mechanisms might dominate.”). 
22 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
23 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
24 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006) (“No person shall introduce or deliver for 
introduction into interstate commerce any new drug, unless an approval of an application 
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through the creation of exclusive rights other than patents and copyrights, 
such as trademarks25 or rights against circumvention of technological 
measures protecting works protected under Title 17.26 Theoretically, 
Congress could respond to the appropriability problem through a range of ex 
ante regulations on entry, pricing or on contractual relations in information-
intensive markets.27 In addition, ex post regulation derived from the 
Commerce power, such as antitrust litigation, interacts with any direct or 
indirect regulation of these markets. The economic literature on intellectual 
property generally assumes that exclusive rights will form the basis for 
markets that will not be subject to additional regulation—with the large and 
notable exception of the markets for pharmaceuticals and biologics—and that 
ex post antitrust regulation is the most significant variable that models 
supporting intellectual property must accommodate.28 Although one could 
argue that this assumption reflects a laissez-faire bias or a lack of regulatory 
imagination, this Article accepts the working hypothesis that it would be 
more efficient to tailor intellectual property rights within the respective 
domains of patent and copyright law rather than to rely upon targeted 
Commerce Clause-based regulation, with the exceptions of health and safety 
regulation a
Finally, the scope of the above three grants of power are augmented by 
the power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by 
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any 
Department or Officer thereof.”29 In fact, when the options are parsed more 
closely, policymakers may select from, or combine, six strategies to solve the 
appropriability problem: 
1) direct provision of creators or innovators employed by the government; 
 
filed pursuant to subsection (b) or (j) of this section is effective with respect to such 
drug.”). 
25 See In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 96–97 (1879) (holding that Commerce 
Clause supports trademark legislation regulating interstate commerce but holding that Act 
under review not so limited). 
26 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201–05 (2006). 
27 Thanks to Josh Sarnoff for this insight. 
28 See, e.g., MICHAEL CARRIER, INNOVATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: HARNESSING 
THE POWER OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW (2009) (summarizing 
literature and proposing model for relationship between intellectual property rights and 
antitrust law). 
29 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) 
(generously construing scope of laws that are “necessary and proper”). 
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2) direct compensation ex ante to the innovator for producing the 
information (leaving the costs of reproduction and distribution to be borne 
by participants in a competitive market), such as a grant to a promising 
innovator; 
3) direct compensation to the innovator ex post through a reward or prize 
system for innovations already created, such as prizes awarded by a number 
of federal government science agencies; 
4) indirect compensation to the innovator through tax policy, by for 
example giving tax credits for investments in research and development; 
5) protection of innovators from competition through the grant of exclusive 
production and distribution rights (thereby encouraging monopoly pricing), 
by creating patent and copyright law; or 
6) other forms of protection from competition or misappropriation by 
increasing excludability of valuable information, by for example prohibiting 
circumvention of technological protection measures.30 
These strategies can be, and usually are, combined in a number of ways, 
but the intellectual property strategy must compete with these others for its 
place in the policy mix. Theoretically, direct investment strategies are 
superior to intellectual property because once the costs of creating and 
commercializing a creative or inventive work have been financed, the 
information should be in the public domain and goods incorporating this 
information can be commoditized.31 Competitive markets efficiently produce 
and distribute commodity goods, such as personal computers, generic drugs 
or books that are no longer under copyright.32 Why, then, is not direct 
payment to innovators the dominant innovation policy in the United States 
and in most other industrialized economies? Direct payment to authors, 
inventors or their creditors is impractical in many circumstances, and the 
intellectual property strategy emerges as a second-best solution to the 
appropriability problem. 
 
30 See WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE 
FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 200–01 (2004); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: 
THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A NETWORKED WORLD 96 (2001); Brett M. Frischmann, 
Innovation and Institutions: Rethinking the Economics of U.S. Science and Technology 
Policy, 24 VT. L. REV. 347, 392–95 (2000) [hereinafter Frischmann, Innovation and 
Institutions] (analyzing trade-offs among policy approaches).  
31 See Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual 
Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 132–33 (2004) [hereinafter Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex 
Post]. 
32 See id. at 135–39 (explaining benefits of competition to promote widespread 
distribution). 
2009] ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL 1371 
 
 
                                                                                                                  
The case for intellectual property has had its ups and downs over time, 
but in recent years it has enjoyed something of a free ride. The case faced 
difficulties in Europe during the latter half of the nineteenth century, where 
the patent system had become tainted with the stink of monopoly.33 Again, in 
the late 1950s, Congress asked an eminent economist to study whether 
continuing to support the patent system was worth its cost. The best he could 
do was to shrug his shoulders: “[I]f we did not have a patent system, it would 
be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge of its economic 
consequences, to recommend instituting one. But since we have had a patent 
system for a long time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present 
knowledge, to recommend abolishing it.”34 
By the 1960s, however, in the depths of the Cold War, the pioneers of 
modern law and economics wrapped the case for intellectual property in the 
flag. Professor Kenneth Arrow, for one, declared that “[i]n an ideal socialist 
economy, the reward for invention would be completely separated from any 
charge to the users of the information” whereas “[i]n a free enterprise 
economy, inventive activity is supported by using the invention to create 
property rights.”35 Arrow recognized that the cost of a system of property 
rights is that “precisely to the extent that it is successful, there is an 
underutilization of the information.”36 But by framing the choice as between 
socialism and “free enterprise,” readers were instructed that a reward system 
for invention and a free enterprise economy are incompatible options. 
Today, the case for intellectual property rights cannot disregard the 
direct-compensation alternatives so summarily. As Arrow acknowledged, 
direct compensation to innovators appears to be preferable to intellectual 
property rights at first glance because this strategy avoids the social costs of 
underutilization.37 In the modern context an emerging literature supports this 
 
33 See ERIC SCHIFF, INDUSTRIALIZATION WITHOUT NATIONAL PATENTS: THE 
NETHERLANDS 1869–1912, SWITZERLAND 1850–1907 40–41 (1971); STEVEN SHAVELL, 
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 164–65 (2004). See generally Mark D. 
Janis, Patent Abolitionism, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 899 (2002) (discussing arguments 
for patent abolition); Fritz Machlup & Edith Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the 
Nineteenth Century, 10 J. ECON. HIST. 1, 1–6 (1950).  
34 SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS & COPYRIGHTS OF THE S. COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 18 (Comm. Print 
1958) (authored by Fritz Machlup), available at http://mises.org/etexts/ patentsystem.pdf. 
35 Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and Allocation of Resources for Invention, 
in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 
614, 623–24 (Nat’l Bureau Comm. for Econ. Research, ed., 1962) (emphasis added) 
(recognizing valuation problems and explaining government choice to procure defense 
research directly by contract rather than through reliance on patent system). 
36 Id. 
37 For early work along these lines, see Michael Polanvyi, Patent Reform, 11 REV. 
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view, advocating for a range of institutional forms of direct compensation.38 
A leading economist, Professor Joseph Stiglitz, has endorsed the use of 
prizes in the drug discovery context,39 and Professor Steven Shavell further 
observes that “in many plausible situations, the reward system would be 
superior to the property rights system.”40 For example, using the abstract, 
formal methodology generally used to support the case for exclusive rights, 
Professors Shavell and Ypersele show that giving the innovator the option to 
choose either a reward calculated from ex post data, such as sales figures, or 
exclusive rights would be preferable to the current patent system. Some 
legislators also have been attracted to this approach.41 This pressure on the 
traditional case for intellectual property is most welcome, and there are 
reasons to expect that this analysis may help alter the mix of government 
policies in favor of direct compensation to some extent. More radical 
economists have concluded that Malchup was too timid and that the absence 
of historical data sufficient to support the case leads to the conclusion that 
“intellectual property is an unnecessary evil.”42 
Nonetheless, the case for intellectual property rights retains its vitality in 
light of three practical considerations necessary to assessing the feasibility 
and desirability of the various strategies for solving the appropriability 
 
ECON. STUD. 61 (1944). 
38 See, e.g., Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging 
Innovation, 113 Q. J. ECON. 1137, 1146–48 (1998) (discussing auction model as superior 
to patent system); Douglas Gary Lichtman, Pricing Prozac: Why the Government Should 
Subsidize the Purchase of Patented Pharmaceuticals, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123, 124–
25 (1997) (subsidizing buyouts by using a coupon scheme); Steven Shavell & Tanguy 
van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525, 526 
(2001) (arguing in favor of optional system that allows innovators to be compensated 
under current patent regime or reward system). A thorough and thoughtful contribution to 
this literature is Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115 
(2003). 
39 See Joseph Stiglitz, Scrooge and Intellectual Property Rights: A Medical Prize 
Fund Could Improve the Financing of Drug Innovations, 333 BRIT. MED. J. 1279 (2006); 
Joseph Stiglitz, Give Prizes Not Patents, NEW SCIENTIST, Sept. 16, 2006, at 21. 
40 STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 163 (2004). 
41 See Medical Prize Innovation Act of 2005, H.R. 417, 109th Cong. (2005) 
(proposing to prohibit ownership of exclusive rights in drugs or biological products and 
creating a fund for Medical Innovation Prizes that would compensate medical 
innovators). For the full-throated argument, see James Love & Tim Hubbard, The Big 
Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R&D for New Medicines, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1519, 1528–34 
(2007). A large bibliography of the relevant literature can be found at Knowledge 
Ecology International, Scholarly and Technical Articles and Books on Innovation Prizes, 
http://www.keionline. org/content/view/82/1 (last visited Mar. 10, 2009). 
42 See MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY 11 
(2008). 
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problem. These are: (1) the government’s ability, relative to private actors, to 
value43 certain types or classes of creation or innovation;44 (2) the 
comparative administrative cost of a strategy; (3) and considerations of 
political economy associated with a particular strategy. By testing the case 
for intellectual property in relation to these practical metrics, the empirical 
and practical premises of the case are laid bare. Once exposed, the case for 
uniform intellectual property rights articulated in Section III, the responsive 
case for tailoring in Section IV, and the framework for tailoring in Section V 
follow as the logical extensions. 
A. The Innovation Lottery—Ignorance and Risk Spreading  
What creative works or inventions will most benefit society? Who will 
create or invent them? Must the government promise some form of reward to 
induce these creators, inventors or their financial backers to bring these 
creations or inventions into being and to share them with the public or find a 
distributor to do so?45 What kind of reward and how much of it is needed? 
Policymakers can answer some of these questions some of the time, but 
usually they must respond that they do not know. For example, within the 
domain of technological innovation, the government can identify certain 
research priorities, such as cures for disease, development of alternative fuel 
sources, or the desire for a better glove for use in outer space.46 But even 
after this is done, identifying who should work on solutions and how much to 
invest remain daunting challenges. In particular the challenge is exacerbated 
because the distribution of returns to investments in research and 
development is highly skew.47 Thus, creativity and innovation usually are 
 
43 Measuring value in this context is more complicated than space allows for full 
discussion, but I recognize that value as measured by price is a relevant but hardly 
exhaustive consideration.  
44 Cf. Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 38, at 534, 541–42 (“[T]he government’s 
knowledge about the social value of innovations . . . is important to the performance of 
the reward system.”). Shavell & van Ypersele argue that the government’s ex ante 
valuations are irrelevant because a reward system can be tied to ex post data reflecting 
demand for the innovation such as sales data. See id. at 541–42. 
45 This question assumes current conditions concerning the relations between 
government and the private sector remain intact. Changes in this relationship—through 
changes in tax policy or market regulation, for example—would alter the range of 
relevant responses as well.  
46 See Jack Hitt, The Amateur Future of Space Travel, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2007, 
(Magazine), at 152 (describing NASA contest for space glove design). 
47 See F. M. Scherer, Economics of Innovation and Technological Change, in 
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 7530, 7535 
(Neil J. Smelser & Paul B. Baltes eds., 2001) (“So skew is the distribution of rewards that 
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uncertain.48 These observations limit the utility of any ex ante compensation 
policy.49 While, in theory, the government can manage this uncertainty 
through post hoc rewards or prizes, the government will have difficulty in 
many circumstances calibrating the reward to the social value contributed by 
the creator or inventor. 
These observations give rise to the ignorance justification for intellectual 
property rights. On this view, government’s relative ignorance about the 
incentives required to lure particular creators or innovators into the 
information production and distribution game and to keep them in it justifies 
the social costs imposed by intellectual property rights. These rights of 
exclusion underwrite a system of innovator control that finances innovation 
through the prospect and the occasional reality of supracompetitive profits in 
the marketplace. 
Information theory supplies the reason. While the ignorance justification 
holds that the government is largely in the dark about the value of any 
particular invention or creation, the inventors or creators will have, on 
average, marginally better information about their potential success in the 
markets for their respective intellectual outputs, and government strategies 
for socializing this private information through some form of mechanism 
design or otherwise are not likely to fully succeed. For this reason, the 
consensus view among economically-oriented commentators is that 
increasing an innovator’s ability to exclude (or at least deter) competitors 
through exclusive rights is superior to reward because the system is driven by 
the marginally superior private information that innovators enjoy.50 
Intellectual property rights are also supported by the cognate risk-
spreading justification. Uncertainty about innovation poses unquantifiable 
risks for whomever chooses to venture labor and capital in pursuit of creative 
or innovative success, however measured. If the government opts for direct 
procurement of innovation through employment or grants, the government 
 
it is difficult to make profits converge toward fairly stable averages by supporting 
feasibly large project portfolios.”). 
48 See generally FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921) 
(explicating the difference between conditions of “risk”—randomness with known 
probabilities—and “uncertainty”—randomness with unknowable probabilities). 
49 See Menell & Scotchmer, supra note 16, at 1477 (“Probably the most important 
obstacle to effective public procurement is in finding the ideas for invention that are 
widely distributed among firms and inventors.”). 
50 See, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic 
Analysis of Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727, 1728 (2000); Lunney, supra 
note 6, at 3, 5 n.9 (“[T]he principal advantage of a regime of exclusive rights is that such 
a regime . . . tends to decentralize the decision-making process, assigning decision-
making responsibility to those likely to possess the relevant, but otherwise private, 
information.”); Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 38, at 528. 
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concentrates the risk of failure in itself. As against this strategy, intellectual 
property rights spread the risk of failure among potential rightsholders who 
either may fail to produce information that qualifies for protection or who 
may succeed in acquiring rights only to have the market deem these worth 
less than the cost of acquisition. From the resource allocation perspective, 
spreading the risk of failure among investors with private information is 
likely to be marginally more efficient than concentrating this risk in the 
government. For, while potential innovators may, on average, enjoy better 
information than the government about potential success, the risks to private 
investors are quite substantial. Indeed, as anyone who watches American Idol 
or any of the other talent competitions currently in vogue on television 
knows, in individual cases, many artists or inventors are mistaken if not 
deluded about the market potential of their talent, their newly composed song 
or new invention.51 
The risk spreading justification for intellectual property operates 
differently with respect to the reward or prize strategy, which enables the 
government to spread the risk of failure among potential innovators while 
also avoiding the social costs of intellectual property rights. Prizes or rewards 
must be designed to produce the desired expected value in the mind of 
innovators and creators, and there are three types of risk that the government 
must manage: (1) identifying the kinds of inventions and creative works 
eligible for reward; (2) identifying the stage of development at which to grant 
rewards; and (3) quantifying the reward. The prize or reward strategy 
concentrates the risk of error in any of these three decision points in the 
government.  
When designing intellectual property rights, the government still risks 
error at each of these same decision points, but the magnitude of risk is 
reduced because, as is discussed in greater detail below, markets enabled by 
intellectual property rights have flexible features that correct to some degree 
for misallocation of rights. These markets also potentially spread decisions 
about which risks should be undertaken and who should bear them.52 
Markets also spread discipline for those who waste assets in pursuit of 
creative or innovative goals. Finally, a less tangible risk that intellectual 
property rights spreads is the risk of cheating by counterparties. For a prize or 
reward strategy to succeed, potential innovators must trust that the 
 
51 Our reliance on the allegedly superior information of private innovators is a 
subject warranting further study. We know from experience that innovators often 
misjudge the likely market value of their innovations. For example, a number of 
pioneering inventors undervalued their innovations. See, e.g., Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex 
Post, supra note 31, at 139 (collecting sources). 
52 See infra Section V.A.6 (discussing relation between design of intellectual 
property rights and decision architecture). 
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government will pay when a reward has been earned. In the markets enabled 
by intellectual property rights, the potential sources of revenue are spread 
among consumers, and the risks that they will take valuable information 
without paying also is spread. Whether spreading this risk through copyright 
law remains an efficient form of cultural policy has become the subject of 
intense debate in light of the changed circumstances known as the Internet. 
Digital networks have greatly increased the capacity for counterparties to 
cheat on the copyright bargain, and rights owners have pursued a range of 
public and private strategies to improve their enforcement capacity that often 
entail a range of collateral consequences for digital communication.53 
In light of the current state of research about, and experience with, 
alternatives to intellectual property, the risk spreading justification generally 
remains persuasive. But it is weakest when applied to the prize or reward 
strategy. More research and experimentation with this approach is warranted 
because the value of eliminating or reducing the social costs of intellectual 
property rights could be significant, particularly in the fields of health and 
agriculture with respect to patents and in the domain of digital 
communication with respect to copyright.54 This research should take into 
account developments in the cognitive sciences about risk perception and 
expected value. 
An additional feature of decentralization supports exclusive rights over 
direct compensation with respect to culture. It might be possible for the 
government to overcome its ignorance by identifying those creators most 
likely to produce valuable works and rely on their superior skills and private 
information to direct initiatives to develop new artistic and educational 
works. The government has partially adopted this option in the sciences 
through grants administered by the National Institutes of Health55 and the 
National Science Foundation.56 The cultural output of creative laborers hired 
 
53 See generally Julie E. Cohen, Pervasively Distributed Copyright Enforcement, 95 
GEO. L.J. 1 (2006) (describing actual and potential consequences of digital enforcement 
initiatives); Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright 
Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345 (2004) (proposing 
cheaper enforcement procedure to limit potential collateral damage from other 
enforcement initiatives). 
54 See generally FISHER, supra note 30, ch. 6 (proposing a reward-like compensation 
scheme for creators in exchange for authorizing file sharing of music and film); Neil W. 
Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2003) (making similar proposal). 
55 See National Institutes of Health, Office of Extramural Research, U.S. Dept. of 
Health & Human Servs., Types of Grant Programs, http://grants.nih.gov/grants/funding/ 
funding_program.htm (last visited July 3, 2009) (describing types of grants provided by 
NIH). 
56 See National Science Foundation, About Funding, http://www.nsf.gov/funding/ 
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by the Works Progress Administration during the Depression indicates that 
this option is not entirely fanciful even in the realm of cultural production.57 
However, precisely because the government lacks a common metric by 
which to value ex ante and ex post cultural works in particular, it is better to 
reject a policy that relies principally on direct government investment in the 
arts.58 
While this Article generally remains within the confines of standard 
economic analysis, here it is necessary to call attention to the problem of the 
gap between willingness-to-pay (WTP) and ability-to-pay (ATP). This gap 
poses a significant obstacle for the standard argument favoring 
decentralization through private investment and market exchange and is a 
drawback that receives insufficient attention in the literature.59 The 
information and product markets supported by intellectual property rights 
operate on the basis of users’ ability to pay rather than willingness to pay to 
reflect the social value of innovation. As a result, the innovations or 
innovators selected for reward by “the market” will skew toward the interests 
of those with an ability to pay, who more often than not are the relatively 
rich.60 Using prices to allocate access to goods and services does not 
accurately reflect how relatively important that access is to different 
individuals because what a dollar is “worth”, and therefore the value of what 
a dollar buys, sometimes depends on how many dollars one has. For 
example, a devoted fan of a particular musical group may scrimp and save to 
purchase a $100 concert ticket; whereas, a wealthy individual may attend the 
concert at that price on a lark because the cost is relatively negligible to that 
 
aboutfunding.jsp (last visited July 3, 2009) (describing range of NSF funding). 
57 See generally WILLIAM F. MCDONALD, FEDERAL RELIEF ADMINISTRATION AND 
THE ARTS: THE ORIGINS AND ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY OF THE ARTS PROJECTS OF THE 
WORKS PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION (1969) (describing federal government support for 
the arts as part of the New Deal). 
58 See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 
1799, 1809–10, 1814 n.43 (2000) (“[B]ecause judging the ‘value’ of most cultural works 
is an inherently subjective exercise, it is not clear that we want any one individual or 
entity to control decisions about which uses of a work are valuable.”); Neil Weinstock 
Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 352–59 (1996).  
59 See Brett Frischmann, Spillovers Theory and Its Conceptual Boundaries, 51 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) [hereinafter Frischmann, Spillovers Theory], 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfm?abstract_id=1357688 (“[T]here are 
good reasons to question whether willingness to pay is a consistently effective 
mechanism for assessing demand where information systems are involved because of the 
prevalence of spillovers.”). 
60 On the difficulties of measuring the gap between willingness-to-pay and ability-
to-pay in the health care context, see, e.g., Steven Russell, Julia Fox-Rushby & Dyna 
Ahrin, Willingness and Ability to Pay for Health Care: A Selection of Methods and 
Issues, 10 HEALTH POL’Y & PLANNING 94 (1995). 
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person. There are likely many other potential fans who, if wealthier, would 
be willing to pay more than the wealthy concert-goer for the privilege of 
attending the show, but the market does not have an effective means for 
reflecting and valuing these poorer fans’ interests and is therefore a poor 
proxy for social value. 
The starkest example of the ways in which relying on ability to pay as a 
measure of improving human welfare misallocates resources is in the 
financing of drug discovery. The patent system directs significant resources 
to the discovery and development of so-called “me-too” and “lifestyle” drugs 
for which wealthy consumers in industrialized economies are able to pay a 
hefty premium.61 These resources are not directed toward discovery and 
development of cures for tropical diseases because the likely beneficiaries 
lack the ability to pay such premiums,62 even though their willingness to pay 
for a drug that would keep a child alive almost certainly is greater than what 
an aging consumer in the industrialized world would be willing to pay to 
enhance his (and perhaps soon, her) sexual performance. The likely 
distortionary effects on resource allocation that follow from the gap between 
willingness-to-pay and ability-to-pay for innovation should serve as a signal 
for policymakers when choosing the right mix of intellectual property and 
direct compensation approaches. For fields of creativity or innovation in 
which the gap is significant, the direct compensation strategy, coupled 
perhaps with a tax strategy,63 is likely to perform better.64  
In sum, as against a centralized government compensation scheme or 
prize fund, the intellectual property strategy offers the benefits of 
decentralization.65 This strategy harnesses the sometimes superior private 
 
61 See, e.g., Love & Hubbard, supra note 41, at 1523–24 (describing incentives and 
costs associated with “me too” drugs). 
62 See generally WILLIAM FISHER & TALHA SYED, DRUGS, LAW, AND THE GLOBAL 
HEALTH CRISIS (2007) (describing economics of drug discovery for tropical disease and 
proposing method for creating incentives to invest in such discovery). 
63 Analyzing the range of tax policies that could be deployed to solve the 
appropriability problem, alone or in combination, is beyond the scope of this Article but 
is an inquiry worthy of further study. 
64 See, e.g., Eleanor C. Saulo et al., Willingness and Ability to Pay for Artemisinin-
Based Combination Therapy in Rural Tanzania, 7 MALARIA J. 227 (2008) (finding gap 
between willingness-to-pay and ability pay for antimalarial drug in Tanzania and 
concluding that data support government policy to subsidize purchases of the drug). 
65 See Lunney, supra note 6, at 3. Decentralization is relative. In a dynamic 
environment, intellectual property limits market entry, which has the effect of 
centralizing some decisions that would be better distributed among competitors. See Tim 
Wu, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Decision Architectures, 92 VA. L. REV. 123, 
127–31 (2006) (arguing that intellectual property law should be tailored to encourage 
hierarchical or polyarchical decisionmaking about innovation depending upon industry 
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information that creators and innovators have about the value of their cultural 
or technological contributions and spreads the risk that they and their 
financial backers may be mistaken about the practical feasibility of a creative 
or innovative idea and about its market valuation if realized. It also spreads 
the risk of mismeasuring the timing or amount of reward necessary to induce 
desired innovations and creative works. The social cost of this strategy is that 
resources are channeled to innovations likely to serve those with an ability to 
pay, and these innovations are likely to be underutilized by those who are 
priced out of the market by monopoly prices or by those who are denied 
licenses because the transaction costs are too high or the rightsholder refuses 
to license.66 The market also is likely to skew toward production of 
consumption information goods rather than productive information goods 
because of the problem of valuing positive spillovers.67 After balancing these 
costs and benefits, policymakers must then assess whether whatever net 
benefits this strategy yields are comparatively worth the administrative cost. 
B. Administrative Cost  
Any strategy for financing innovation comes with a price. Someone must 
be paid to perform an adjudication function to identify those deserving to 
receive entitlements or to enforce entitlements already granted. In addition, a 
policy must support a transaction structure. Since the focus of comparative 
institutional analysis is on the total social benefits and costs, it is important to 
assess the efficiencies associated with how a strategy performs these 
functions without regard to whether they are financed directly by taxpayers 
or indirectly by consumers who pay supracompetitive prices. 
Under a direct compensation strategy, the government directly finances a 
greater share of total administrative costs by supplying one or more agencies 
responsible for identifying and rewarding innovators. Some of these 
personnel costs would be borne by existing agencies, such as those who 
administer the tax system,68 while others might be borne by agencies that 
would have to be created to implement a particular approach. If the 
compensation scheme is ex ante, then a grants mechanism would be required 
similar to that used by granting agencies such as the National Institutes of 
Health. If a reward or bounty were offered for innovation, an agency would 
 
maturity and other factors). 
66 See, e.g., Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. 
REV. 257, 278–79 (2007).  
67 Id. 
68 See Kremer, supra note 38, at 14 (explaining that taxation of pharmaceuticals will 
have “benign consequences”); Lichtman, supra note 38, at 130–31; Shavell & Ypersele, 
supra note 38, at 544 (noting simply that taxation is required). 
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be required to determine the parameters under which rewards are available 
and whether a reward had been earned. Under post hoc compensation 
schemes, the agency would also be responsible for metering value to 
calculate the reward. These direct administrative adjudication or examination 
costs would likely be higher than those associated with an intellectual 
property strategy, even if the government were to deploy some form of 
examination prior to granting rights. 
In exchange for substantial direct administrative costs associated with 
identifying those innovators deserving financial reward and administering the 
associated financing, direct compensation policies involve minimal costs 
associated with supporting a transaction structure. Information would be in 
the commons and would not require administrative support for licensing and 
litigation. Taking these trade-offs into consideration, some proponents have 
argued that their proposals are no more, and may prove far less, expensive to 
administer than the intellectual property system.69 
In contrast, the intellectual property strategy leaves most of the total 
administrative costs in private hands.70 Traditionally, the costs of deciding 
which innovators deserve financial reward has been borne by intermediaries 
with access to capital who fund a variety of screening mechanisms through 
which a creative work or innovation must pass before gaining access to 
substantial capital. In the creative fields, this screening function has been 
performed by literary agents and editors at book publishing houses, managers 
and artists-and-repertoire employees in the recording business, agents and an 
array of “suits” at movie studios, and their counterparts in the performing and 
visual arts. 
In the inventive fields, the function of judging innovations deserving 
reward reflects a different mix of ex ante and post hoc decisionmaking. In a 
number of fields, those who fund innovation bet on innovators, who they 
bring inside the boundary of the firm through employment, rather than on 
innovations. This strategy often depends upon the number of competitors and 
whether short-term or longer-term rewards are sought.71 In other fields that 
rely on innovation, such as the toy business, companies rely on independent 
 
69 See Lichtman, supra note 38, at 129–32 (discussing administrative costs of 
proposed system); Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 38, at 543–44 (noting simply that 
taxation is required). 
70 One reason for private administration is lack of transparency in the operation of 
the property system, particularly with respect to licensing activities. The lack of readily 
available data about patent and copyright licensing raises the information costs for 
government regulation of markets in which such licensing takes place. Thanks to Josh 
Sarnoff for this point. 
71 See S. Kurokawa, Make or Buy Decisions in R&D: Small Technology Firms in 
the United States and Japan, 44 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON ENGINEERING MGMT. 124, 124–
34 (1997). 
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inventors, who pass through screens similar to those employed to sort 
copyrighted works.72 
The intellectual property strategy also requires courts to enforce rights 
and licenses, and, in the case of patents, for an agency to administer the 
examination scheme through which the entitlement vests.73 In addition, the 
total costs of the transaction structure are far higher than under a direct 
compensation scheme because users must obtain licenses or permissions, and 
the boundaries of these transactions must be policed.74 Measuring these 
transaction costs is quite difficult because they are borne by a substantial 
number of persons and entities. However, because the parties with superior 
information about the value of their innovations must bear a portion of these 
costs, they will have strong incentives to seek administrative efficiency.75 
For example, the percentage of patents that parties consider valuable enough 
to enforce through litigation is quite low.
In the end, the direct compensation strategy likely involves lower total 
administrative costs than the intellectual property strategy. Both require 
financing of an adjudication function to identify which creators or innovators 
deserve financial reward. With respect to this cost component, the intellectual 
property strategy probably performs in a more cost-effective manner, leaving 
aside for the moment the normative differences in the criteria for selecting 
which innovators or innovations should receive financing. Although some 
arbitrariness and corruption may occur in the process by which books are 
selected for publication, movies for production, or music for recording, the 
financiers are by-and-large publicly traded multinational companies subject 
to discipline in the global capital markets. So it is likely that these actors are 
likely to perform the identification function more cost-effectively than 
government employees subject to public fiscal oversight, although this faith 
 
72 See, e.g., Cynthia Wagner Weick & Cynthia F. Eakin, Independent Inventors and 
Innovation: An Empirical Study, 6 INT’L J. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & INNOVATION 5, 5–14 
(2005) (finding that independent inventors surveyed invented primarily household 
products, hardware and tools, industrial products, and novelty items and toys). 
73 See 35 U.S.C. § 111 (2006) (requiring application for patent). 
74 See, e.g., Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng’g & Consulting, Inc., 421 
F.3d 1307, 1315–17 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (reviewing case law on claims of copyright 
infringement resulting from exceeding scope of software license). 
75 See Robert P. Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property 
Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1302–07 (1996) 
(using new institutional economic theory to justify use of property rule to encourage 
bargaining toward a liability rule equilibrium). 
76 See John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 437–39 (2004) 
(reporting the results of an empirical study of litigated patents). 
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in comparative private sector efficiency is based as much on theory as data in 
this context. 
However, when the total costs of intellectual property licensing and 
litigation are added to the equation, the intellectual property strategy 
becomes quite expensive. With respect to total transactional costs, only the 
roughest of estimates can be ventured. This is particularly true because for 
comparative purposes; it is necessary to tease out those aspects of a 
transaction that are necessary because of the presence of intellectual property 
rights even though there may well be other parts of the deal which would be 
present in analogous transactions in the shadow of the direct compensation 
strategy. This is an important and largely intractable analytic task. I am not 
aware of any studies that isolate the role of intellectual property rights in the 
transactional setting, and it is hard to imagine how this might be measured or 
tested directly. Litigation costs are somewhat easier to estimate,77 although 
the costs of pre-litigation threats and responses are fairly elusive.78 
Even with this uncertainty about the precise magnitude of licensing and 
litigation costs, it is enough for present purposes to know that these are 
significant. When compared to the very minimal costs to support a 
transaction and litigation structure under a pure direct compensation strategy, 
it is almost certain that the direct compensation strategy is less expensive to 
administer, assuming that information produced by this strategy is in the 
public domain and not amenable to contractual fencing. 
C. Political Economy  
Leaving the realms of theory and empirical analysis, analysts must 
acknowledge that even when direct financing of innovation is more efficient, 
three political considerations render the intellectual property strategy more 
attractive to policymakers than the direct compensation strategies. First, 
imposing taxes on the public indirectly through the creation of exclusive 
rights is politically far cheaper than having to justify direct taxation and 
direct expenditure of government funds on innovation. The grant of 
 
77 See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 132 (2008) (combining data 
from the American Intellectual Property Law Association with authors’ data); Jean O. 
Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: A Survey of the 
Empirical Literature, in THE ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS OF INNOVATION 201, 202 
(David Encaoua et al. eds., 2000) (finding that “the need to defend patents through costly 
litigation can have significant impact on their value”). 
78 While prelitigation costs are elusive, event studies enable some measure of the 
costs of early stage litigation for public firms. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 77, at 
132–38 (summarizing event study methodology and data for patent infringement suits 
filed against publicly traded firms). 
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intellectual property rights taxes the public in an indirect means to an 
uncertain magnitude ex ante, causing the rights to be spent with far less 
administrative evaluation of the social return on investment than is the case 
with direct procurement. For example, in the current climate, increasing 
income taxes has become politically very difficult. However, from an 
economic perspective, when Congress extended the term of existing 
copyrights by 20 years,79 it passed a tax increase. Consumers of those 
copyrighted works subject to the term extension will pay a copyright 
premium that is analogous to the prize or reward that would be paid had the 
government collected the funds through taxation and paid out directly.80 This 
dynamic suggests that, on the one hand, it could be politically difficult to pay 
directly for innovations that improve social welfare and currently are induced 
by the promise of intellectual property rights, and, on the other hand, that the 
political costs of expanding intellectual property rights in response to rent 
seeking are substantially lower than would be the case if the government 
increased income taxes, or imposed more targeted use taxes, in order to pay 
out to particular private interests. 
In patent law, for example, patent examiners theoretically serve the 
function of government contracting officers.81 According to the terms of the 
patent bargain, their role is to procure for the public only those inventions 
worthy of a patent according to the law. The examiner must ensure that the 
scope of any patent that issues is limited to that which the inventor has 
contributed to the art. Although the actual interactions between patentees and 
examiners is quite different from public procurement processes, in economic 
effect, this negotiation is much like a contracting officer negotiating with a 
government contractor over price.82 Public pressure is much greater with 
respect to contracts that impose direct costs on the public fisc—say, in the 
 
79 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 
Stat. 2827 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 108, 203(a)(2), 301(c), 302–304 (2006)). 
80 See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 244–45, 248–49 (2003) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (emphasizing copyright’s function as a tax on readers and surmising that “one 
might conservatively estimate that 20 extra years of copyright protection will mean the 
transfer of several billion extra royalty dollars to holders of existing copyrights—
copyrights that, together, already will have earned many billions of dollars in royalty 
‘reward.’”). 
81 The gap between theory and practice on this point is significant. Those who study 
the institutional arrangements and the incentives they produce inside the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office tell a story of an organization funded by application fees that treats 
patent applicants as customers rather than suppliers. See, e.g., Clarisa Long, The PTO and 
the Market for Influence in Patent Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1965, 1988 (2009). 
82 See, e.g., Kelly Casey Mullally, Patent Hermeneutics: Form and Substance in 
Claim Construction, 59 FLA. L. REV. 333, 346 (2007) (describing patent prosecution and 
analogizing it to contract negotiation). 
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form of a hammer that, for regulatory compliance reasons, appeared to cost 
$43583—than it is with respect to issued patents that are invalid or overly 
broad in scope.84 This is not to say that the Patent and Trademark Office 
never receives public rebuke for giving away the store when negotiating with 
applicants.85 But, from a comparative perspective, when they pay too much 
or grant rights that are too broad, public officials are likely to receive much 
greater negative publicity and public pressure with respect to procurement of 
innovation through the direct expenditure of public dollars rather than the 
granting of private rights through which dollars are indirectly extracted from 
the public. 
A related feature of public attention to price under the direct 
compensation strategy—either by a mandatory reward system or through 
exercise of eminent domain—is the Pied Piper problem in which the public’s 
ex ante and ex post valuations shift. As most will recall, in Robert 
Browning’s poem, The Pied Piper of Hamlein,86 the piper agrees to rid 
Hamlein of its rat infestation with his magic pipe for one thousand guilders. 
After receiving the benefit of its bargain, however, the town council 
breaches, claiming the contract price was a joke and offers the piper a mere 
fifty guilders. We can imagine a similar set of circumstances occurring with 
particularly valuable inventions, for which budget-strained administrators 
would be tempted to manipulate the reward formula. 
 
83 See James Fairhall, The Case for the $435 Hammer–Investigation of Pentagon’s 
Procurement, WASH. MONTHLY, Jan. 1987, at 47–52 (“In the three years since the story 
broke, the $435 hammer has become synonymous with waste in the Department of 
Defense (DOD). From Beetle Bailey to Walter Mondale, everyone has expressed outrage 
at this apparent swindle.”).  
84 Academic commentators agree that invalid patents are granted with some routine 
frequency, but there is a division of opinion about what to do in response. See, e.g., 
Shubha Ghosh & Jay Kesan, What Do Patents Purchase? In Search of Optimal 
Ignorance in the Patent Office, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1219, 1224–36 (2004) (arguing that 
issued patents that are invalid are more costly than Lemley estimates and arguing for 
greater expenditure in response); Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent 
Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495 (2001) (arguing that it is rational for the patent system to 
accept relatively high error rate in granting patents); Arti K. Rai, Emerging Facts and 
Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 
1035, 1080–84 (2003) (agreeing in part but advocating some greater expenditure through 
opposition proceedings to improve patent quality). 
85 See, e.g., Ghosh & Kesan, supra note 84, at 1220 (“Reports of the [PTO] granting 
absurd patents are rampant. Peanut butter sandwiches, pet toys on a stick, hammocks for 
cats, and one-click shopping have each been the subject of a newspaper or magazine 
story, and each serve as evidence of how ‘patently absurd’ the work of the [PTO] is.” 
(citations omitted)). 
86 See generally ROBERT BROWNING, THE PIED PIPER OF HAMELIN (1888), reprinted 
at http://www.indiana.edu/~librcsd/etext/piper/. 
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Consider, for example, the political viability of a reward scheme in the 
case of operating system software. Whatever public disapproval of the wealth 
Bill Gates has amassed in the market his company controls pales in 
comparison to that which would ensue were he and his fellow shareholders to 
receive a mulitbillion-dollar payout from the public fisc as a reward for 
Windows—especially for Windows Vista! It appears that taxpayers in 
industrialized economies generally are far more comfortable with winners in 
the marketplace than with winners of government largesse even when the 
government supplies the rights that make the market possible. 
Second, the risk-spreading rationale reappears in a new guise. Recall that 
this argument holds that some failure in attempted innovation is certain and 
that markets are better suited to finance the costs of failure. Government can 
withstand a fair degree of criticism for failed investments in biomedicine or 
national defense technologies, but, at least in the United States, taxpayers 
would be far more skeptical of a scheme in which the government hired 
inventors of consumer goods or storytellers (such as filmmakers) and 
songwriters to supply the public’s needs. (Although, the Walker Evans 
photographs and folk music produced with support from the Works Progress 
Administration are evidence to the contrary.)87 Taxpayers in other industrial 
economies have shown far greater acceptance of direct government funding 
of cultural production and cultural institutions,88 and thus some of the 
observations about comparative political economy made herein are 
necessarily culturally specific to the United States. 
Nonetheless, however financed, we know that these investments will 
sometimes be wasted.89 The direct compensation strategy invites greater 
negative political pressure from failure because it will be more visible and 
palpable to voters and because they are likely to react far more negatively to 
the centralization of risk in a set of government agencies than they are to the 
consequences of self-deluded or mistaken inventors and creators who seek 
wealth through intellectual property rights. Proponents of the direct 
compensation strategy recognize and respond to the risk-spreading concern 
by arguing that post hoc compensation schemes, such as rewards and prizes, 
 
87 See, e.g., THOMAS NAU, WALKER EVANS: PHOTOGRAPHER OF AMERICA 35–37 
(2007) (describing arrangement by which Evans as government employee took temporary 
leave from government employment to take famous photographs of tenant farmers for 
Fortune magazine but with copyright rights owned by the U.S. Government). 
88 See, e.g., J. MARK DAVIDSON SCHUSTER, SUPPORTING THE ARTS: AN 
INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE STUDY. CANADA, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, 
FRANCE, ITALY, GREAT BRITAIN, NETHERLANDS, SWEDEN, UNITED STATES, NATIONAL 
ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS 42–47 (1985), available at http://eric.ed.gov/ERICWeb 
Portal/contentdelivery/ servlet/ERICServlet?accno=ED257740. 
89 See Scherer, supra note 47, at 7535. 
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avoid the problem of paying for what is unwanted.90 Prizes risk being set too 
high or too low to induce the desired level of investment in innovation, 
however. Rewards tied to market success are the closest approximation to the 
beneficial risk allocation features of the intellectual strategy. 
Third, while reward tied to market success would effectively neutralize 
the risk-spreading concern, this design choice for direct compensation 
highlights the most politically troublesome comparative disadvantage for the 
direct compensation strategy—agency costs. A mechanism for direct 
government pay-outs to innovators could be attractive to policymakers as a 
means of personal enrichment or as a means to reward political supporters or 
to threaten opponents. Experience with existing government grants to 
science, education, and culture suggest that this concern may be overstated. 
In the United States, political considerations undoubtedly play a role in 
setting research priorities and in causing investments to be geographically 
spread across congressional districts even if they might be more efficiently 
concentrated in large urban research centers, but there has been little 
evidence of outright self-dealing by politicians. Nonetheless, even if direct 
investment were adopted for public-spirited reasons, administrative 
corruption or incompetence could lead to manipulation for personal gain by 
private actors. Finally, for rewards to be tied to market success, some form of 
metering of use or other proxy for value must be created to measure how 
strong the winners in the innovation game are. Any metering regime would 
be susceptible to self-interested manipulation by the innovator and would be 
likely to require widespread deployment of privacy-invasive technologies 
and systems.91 
With respect to the intellectual property strategy, public sector agency 
costs (in the economic sense of the term) are of two types. The first and most 
often discussed is the problem of legislative and administrative capture.92 
This phenomenon results from the frequency and energy with which 
 
90 See, e.g., George Johnson, Eureka! Where Do I Cash the Check, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 
29, 2008 (Week in Review) (summarizing history of prizes as incentive for scientific 
innovation and remarking, “Best of all, the prize has to be paid only if there is a 
winner.”). 
91 Cf. Julie E. Cohen, Pervasively Distributed Copyright Enforcement, 95 GEO. L.J. 
1, 3–19 (2006) (describing current privacy-invasive enforcement strategies by 
rightsholders facing similar challenges). 
92 According to this theory, legislative outcomes will be inefficient where discrete 
groups with common interests can manipulate the legislative process so as to secure 
redistributive legislation at the expense of large, heterogeneous groups that do not protect 
their interests because the costs of collective action are too high. See, e.g., DOUGLASS C. 
NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 110 
(1990) (“Because polities make and enforce economic rules, it is not surprising that 
property rights are seldom efficient.”). 
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rightsholders can make their case, which can lead to skewed perspectives 
about the interests at stake. Legislators, administrators and their staff 
members may favor proposals by rightsholders for self-interested reasons, 
such as the hope or expectation of well-compensated employment by a 
rightsholder or rightsholder organization, even when such proposals 
effectively increase taxes on the public without a corresponding return in 
creation or innovation. While interest groups clearly have outside influence 
on intellectual property legislation and administration,93 there are 
countervailing checking forces in the process. The relative independence of 
the judiciary limits the agency costs associated with interpretation of the 
law.94  
Less well-recognized is the fact that the capacity for more directly 
corrupt self-dealing by administrative officials in an exclusive rights regime 
is cabined. Copyrights are granted without any government intervention, 
eliminating opportunities for self-dealing at the entitlement-granting stage.95 
(However, the ready grant of such rights also affects the political economy of 
intellectual property by enlarging the class of incumbents.) While a copyright 
owner of a U.S. work must attempt to register her claim to copyright before 
enforcing her rights, the rules are designed so that even if registration were 
refused by a corrupt official seeking a bribe or other benefit from the 
copyright owner, such a strategy would likely be unsuccessful.96 
The current design of the patent system entails somewhat greater risk of 
self-dealing or corruption, but this risk is still relatively minimal. The 
potential entry points for corruption are in the processes of patent 
examination, re-examination, continuation, or re-issue.97 Certain obvious 
 
93 See, e.g., Robert Patrick Merges & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The Proper Scope of 
the Copyright and Patent Power, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 45, 53–56 (2000) (summarizing 
public choice literature and providing examples of legislative capture in the intellectual 
property context). 
94 There is a large literature on public choice theory and the role of an independent 
judiciary that need not be parsed here. The point is simply that because the federal courts 
have exclusive jurisdiction over patent and copyright law, 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2006), and 
federal judges have life tenure, they are less likely to use the discretion inherent in 
statutory interpretation for economically self-interested reasons than would be other 
decisionmakers more dependent on industry largesse. For this elementary point, see 
generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an 
Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975). 
95 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 201 (2006) (describing eligibility for copyright and rules 
for vesting). 
96 See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2006) (Copyright owner may bring an infringement 
action even after refusal to register by Copyright Office). 
97 For example, in the litigation that threatened to render the Blackberries on which 
many offices in Washington depend useless, the patent owner, NTP, alleged that the PTO 
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risks, such as patent examiners’ potential conflicts of interest are addressed 
by PTO rules, and these rules generally appear to be followed. Other forms of 
graft or corruption in which patent examiners or other officials in the PTO 
accept cash or in kind payments to deviate from their duties appear to be rare. 
Finally, the risk of insider trading by officials also seems to be in check. This 
risk is probably more significant among private sector insiders.98 
III. WHY ONE-SIZE-FITS-ALL PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS? 
Accepting that intellectual property rights have a place in any 
overarching innovation policy, this Section now turns to the question of how 
the ignorance and risk-spreading rationales influence the definition of the 
subject matter, scope, and duration of these intellectual property rights.  
Conceivably, a single right or bundle of rights might do the job.99 But, 
since the eighteenth century rights granted to inventors and authors have 
been tailored for historical reasons and to reflect economic differences 
between functional innovation and creative progress.100 Having tailored 
 
had bent the rules with respect to a request for reexamination in order to respond to 
pressure from Members of Congress who did not want to lose their connectivity. See 
NTP, Response to Final Office Action of Feb. 24, 2006, Docket No. 49671.000006, 
available at http://www.patenthawk.com/rulings/NTP-Reexam-Response.pdf. For present 
purposes, the truth or falsity of these allegations is immaterial insofar as the allegations 
illustrate the opportunities for self-interested officials to depart from established rules and 
procedures. 
98 See, e.g., Gautam Ahuja, Russell W. Coff & Peggy M. Lee, Managerial Foresight 
and Attempted Rent Appropriation: Insider Trading on Knowledge of Imminent 
Knowledge Breakthroughs, 26 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 791, 805 (2005) (“Our results 
suggest that managers do anticipate breakthrough innovations and trade on that 
information before patent applications have been filed.”). 
99 Some efforts during the first decade of the new millennium sought to merge the 
branches of intellectual property into a single exclusive right on the grounds that 
businesses no longer differentiate forms of intellectual property in practice. See Graeme 
B. Dinwoodie, “One Size Fits All”: Consolidation and Difference in Intellectual 
Property Law (July 21, 2008) (working paper presented at ATRIP Conference, Munich, 
available at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/5801021/one-size-fits-all). In some senses, the 
idea is not new. The precursors to modern patents and copyrights were royal privileges or 
letters patent granted into the eighteenth century that were ad hoc in scope and duration 
but “uniform” insofar as they did not systematically differentiate rights based on whether 
the subject was an invention or creative expression. See, e.g., Michael W. Carroll, Whose 
Music Is It Anyway?: How We Came To View Musical Expression As A Form Of 
Property, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1405, 1405, 1452, 1465 (2004). 
100 See, e.g., Dennis S. Karjala, Distinguishing Patent and Copyright Subject 
Matter, 35 CONN. L. REV. 439, 524 (2003) (arguing that digital technology creates 
pressure on the expression/function distinction between copyrightable and patentable 
subject matter); Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 
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rights at this high level of generality, the law in the United States and in most 
other nations then delineates patents and copyrights uniformly without regard 
to context of invention or creation. Under U.S. patent law, an invention is 
eligible for protection if it is a new, useful, and non-obvious “process, 
manufacture, machine, or composition of matter.”101 Each patentee receives 
the same package of rights—to exclude others from making, using, selling, 
offering to sell, or importing the invention102—for the same period of time—
20 years after the date an application was filed in the Patent and Trademark 
Office.103  
Under U.S. copyright law, any “original work of authorship” that has 
been “fixed in a tangible medium of expression” automatically gets a 
copyright.104 The owner of a copyright has the exclusive rights to reproduce, 
publicly distribute, and adapt the work.105 In addition, for most classes of 
work for which it would matter economically, the owner also has the 
exclusive rights to publicly perform and publicly display the work.106 The 
initial grant of rights has been tailored for the music industry by limiting the 
performance right in sound recordings to digital audio transmissions.107 A 
range of other provisions tailor the scope of copyright.108  
In previous work, researchers, including me, have shown that from a 
theoretical perspective this policy of one-size-fits-all patents and copyrights 
necessarily is inefficient.109 The magnitude of the appropriability problems 
that these rights are designed to remedy varies considerably across and even 
within industries.110 In particular, this policy imposes uniformity cost on 
society by failing to supply fine-grained rights tailored to the economic 
circumstances of different classes of authors and inventors.111  
 
465, 466–71 (2004) (making economic argument for tailoring subject matter of patent 
and copyright).  
101 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03 (2006). 
102 See id. § 271(a). 
103 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006). 
104 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). 
105 See id. § 106. 
106 See id. 
107 See id. § 106(6). 
108 See, e.g., id. §§ 107–22. 
109 Carroll, One for All, supra note 15 (citing sources).  
110 See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. 
L. REV. 1575, 1581–83 (2003) [hereinafter Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers] (comparing 
the pharmaceutical industry, which requires a large research and development (R&D) 
budget, to the computer software industry which can operate on a much smaller budget). 
111 See id. 
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Two recent books bring the problem of uniformity cost in patent law to 
the fore. Professors Dan Burk and Mark Lemley argue that the social costs 
and benefits of nominally uniform patent rights vary significantly along 
industry- and technology-specific lines, giving rise to a crisis in the patent 
system that can be, and should be, solved through judicial tailoring.112 
Professors James Bessen and Michael Meurer analyze whether patents 
perform as economic theory expects property rights to do, and they conclude 
that there is a significant gap between the patent system and a model property 
system and that “[e]conomics research confirms that the effectiveness of 
patents varies by type of invention.”113 Strikingly, both books provide a stark 
depiction of uniformity cost by describing a system of one-size-fits-all 
patents that works well for the chemical and pharmaceutical industries while 
imposing a drag on innovation in the information technology industries.114 
How, then, does the proponent of uniform intellectual property rights defend 
a system design that imposes this cost on society? 
The argument for uniform rights is grounded in the same ignorance and 
risk-spreading justifications as the intellectual property rights strategy. These 
same asymmetries supply the basis for one-size-fits-all as an initial domestic 
policy. The same uncertainty about innovation that justifies copyright and 
patent in general also means that policymakers lack a solid basis for tailoring 
rights to particular forms of expression, types of technology or to specific 
industries. Whether uniform rights outperform tailored rights with respect to 
administrative costs or public choice distortions depends on the context. 
A. Public and Private Information 
For the government to tailor rights according to subject matter or the 
status of the innovator (such as a university researcher), the government 
would require some basis for distinguishing among classes of innovation or 
innovators. The ignorance justification for intellectual property rights also 
justifies adopting uniform rights targeted at the average level of exclusion 
needed to stimulate the desired level of investment in innovation throughout 
 
112 DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS 
CAN SOLVE IT (Univ. of Chi. Press 2009). 
113 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 77, at 256. 
114 See id. at 16 (summarizing findings that “chemical and pharmaceutical firms 
earn far more from their patents than they lose to litigation[,] [b]ut for other [public] 
firms . . . [b]y almost any interpretation, the United States patent system could not be 
providing overall positive incentives . . . by the end of the 1990s”); BURK & LEMLEY, 
supra note 112, at 3–4 (stating that “[i]n the pharmaceutical industry, there seems to be a 
strong consensus . . . that patents are critical to innovation . . . [whereas] [l]awyers and 
executives in the information technology industries . . . almost invariably see the patent 
system as a cost rather than a benefit to innovation.”). 
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the economy. The government initially lacks the information necessary to 
make principled distinctions among innovators or classes of innovation. 
Moreover, innovation is inherently dynamic.115 The case for uniformity 
argues that even if the government were able to gather information sufficient 
to make a principled distinction between the rights accorded to innovation 
category A and innovation category B, the boundaries of those categories are 
likely to change.116 Technology-specific or subject matter-specific laws will 
become outdated quickly and therefore fail to provide the efficiency gains 
sought by tailoring. These practical obstacles to tailoring provide support for 
uniform rights as a second best solution. Thus, uniform patents and 
copyrights are second-order second best, or, in other words, a second-best 
solution nested within the second-best solution of intellectual property rights. 
1. Tailoring Through Market Exchange 
The case for one-size-fits-all also holds that the intellectual property 
strategy has built-in features to reduce uniformity cost. The argument starts 
with a general proposition that generally-defined rights are easy to ascertain 
ex ante and that any social costs arising from the choice of uniform rights do 
not warrant concern because once the rights vest, private ordering ensures 
that rewards generated by ownership of intellectual property rights flows to 
those who deserve the rewards.  
The magnitude of social costs incurred when the government rewards all 
innovators with the same entitlement depends on the currency used. If the 
government were to grant a uniform monetary entitlement to all inventors—
say a bounty of $1 million—whether their invention was a life-saving 
biomedical device or a novelty toy, the social costs of uniformity would be 
apparent and such a system would be grossly inefficient. 
As I previously have discussed at greater length, intellectual property 
rights harness three market-based features that 
reduce uniformity cost: demand elasticity, price discrimination, and 
Coasean bargaining.117 The social costs of intellectual property rights arise 
only when there is demand for protected information. If demand for a 
novelty toy that would have been invented in the absence of protection is 
zero, then even though granting uniform patent rights was unnecessary, 
 
115 See, e.g., Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of 
Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 880–908 (1990) (categorizing stages of innovation 
in different industries). 
116 See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 110, at 1635–36 (making this argument 
with respect to legislative tailoring). 
117 This discussion summarizes Carroll, One for All, supra note 15, at 857–61. 
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uniformity cost is zero because no potential buyers have been excluded.118 
Uniformity costs rise with demand.119 
Even when uniformity cost arises, under traditional economic analysis, 
perfect price discrimination theoretically would eliminate the 
underdistribution of protected information. That is, if intellectual property 
owners are able to engage fully in first-degree price discrimination—selling 
or icensing to each user willing to pay more than marginal cost—static 
deadweight loss would be zero.120  
As others have shown, however, even as a matter of theory, perfect price 
discrimination would not eliminate all social costs of intellectual property 
rights.121 Moreover, even if perfect price discrimination would theoretically 
 
118 Id. at 858 n.44 (“Of course, demand for the invention does not refer to only 
demand in product markets. Any potential user of information for which a patent owner 
might make a credible threat must be plotted on the invention’s demand curve.”). For a 
site dedicated to identifying such low-demand inventions, see Patently Silly, available at 
http://www.patentlysilly.com. 
119 Carroll, One for All, supra note 15, at 858 n.45 (“Increases in demand for a work 
also attract free riding competitors so that increases in demand increase both the 
magnitude of the appropriability problem and the magnitude of social cost.”); cf. Glynn 
S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 
483, 557 (1996) (incentives and access are both functions of degree of market power 
conferred by exclusive rights). “Although we should expect rising demand to generate 
correlated offsetting effects in many cases, when creators of popular works do not require 
the power over price that patent or copyright promise, uniformity costs rise.” Carroll, One 
for All, supra note 15, at 858 n.45. 
120 See HAL VARIAN & CARL SHAPIRO, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE 
TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY 39 (1999); Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of 
Public Goods, 13 J.L. & ECON. 293, 303–04 (1970). 
121 See, e.g., V. Bhaskar & Ted To, Is Perfect Price Discrimination Really Efficient? 
An Analysis Of Free Entry, 35 RAND J. OF ECON. 762, 775 (2004); Aaron S. Edlin, 
Mario Epelbaum & Walter P. Heller, Is Perfect Price Discrimination Really Efficient? 
Welfare and Existence in General Equilibrium, 66 ECONOMETRICA 897, 897–99 (1998); 
see also Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799, 1799–
1808 (2000); Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory Of Infrastructure and Commons 
Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 978–80 (2005) (discussing distortionary effects of 
promoting price discrimination); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Copyright’s Price Discrimination 
Panacea, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 387, 393 (2008) (explaining shortcomings of 
conventional legal analysis of price discrimination); Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law 
and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 55, 57–58 (2001) [hereinafter Meurer, 
Price Discrimination]. 
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avoid reduction in social value, perfect first-degree price discrimination in 
the intellectual property context is a practical impossibility . . . .122 
“Finally, when demand is positive and price discrimination is imperfect, 
the Coase Theorem asserts that uniformity cost will affect allocative 
efficiency only if reallocation or reapportionment of uniform entitlements by 
contract is too costly.”123 Through licensing and non-enforcement of 
intellectual property rights, those who need to use another’s information will 
obtain access and the practical ability to use it. Consequently, the theoretical 
advantages of publicly tailored rights are minimized by tailoring through 
private ordering supported by judicial and other public enforcement. 
While licensing and enforcement practices undoubtedly relieve some of 
the pressure that a one-size-fits-all approach produces, these are not complete 
solutions. Most commentators agree that difficulties in valuing patents and 
copyrights raise transaction costs to the point that allocative efficiency will 
depend upon the subject matter, scope and duration of intellectual property 
entitlements.124 This is particularly true because the externalities that justify 
patent and copyright law differ fundamentally from those that inspired 
Coase,125 and the law’s choice is not between granting an entitlement to 
party A or to party B but between granting an entitlement to party A or to the 
 
122 Carroll, One for All, supra note 15, at 857–59; see, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Brett 
M. McDonnell, Why (and How) Fairness Matters at the IP/Antitrust Interface, 87 MINN. 
L. REV. 1817, 1867 (2003) (noting that perfect price discrimination is impossible); 
Lemley, supra note 20, at 1059 n.115; Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product 
Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212, 255, 255–56 (2004) (same). 
123 Carroll, One for All, supra note 15, at 857–59; see R.H. Coase, The Problem of 
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 16 (1960) (“In these conditions [of high transaction costs] 
the initial delimitation of legal rights does have an effect on the efficiency with which the 
economic system operates.”). While arguing that policymakers should recognize the 
effects they have on allocative efficiency when fashioning legal rights for high-
transaction-cost environments, Coase also recognized that distributional justice matters 
and that “the choice between different social arrangements for the solution of economic 
problems should be carried out in broader terms than this [maximizing total output] and 
that the total effect of these arrangements in all spheres of life should be taken into 
account.” Coase, supra, at 43. 
124 See, e.g., James Bessen, Holdup and Licensing of Cumulative Innovations With 
Private Information, 82 ECON. LETTERS 321, 326 (2004) (showing that “[t]he possibility 
of ex ante licensing does not eliminate the problem of holdup in cumulative innovation”); 
Clarisa Long, Proprietary Rights and Why Initial Allocations Matter, 49 EMORY L.J. 823, 
831–36 (2000) (arguing that uncertainty in valuation of patents on basic research tools is 
likely to block efficient licensing of such tools). 
125 See Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 20, at 1031; Mark A. Lemley, What’s 
Different About Intellectual Property?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1098–1100 (2005) (reply 
essay); Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post, supra note 31, at 129–35. 
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public at large, comprised of an unknown and often unknowable proportion 
of higher- and lower-valued users. Consequently, allocative inefficiency in 
intellectual property law potentially imposes a far more significant social 
cost than it does with respect to tangible property.126 Uniformity cost is then 
a real problem in intellectual property law. 
The proponent of uniform intellectual property rights would be likely to 
be a transaction cost optimist. Such a proponent would argue in the 
alternative that if transaction costs are high enough to distort allocative 
efficiency, this is simply the price society must pay for reliance on the 
imperfect institution of rights of exclusion. 
2. Tailoring Through Real Options and Standards 
Recognizing uniformity cost, the proponent for one-size-fits-all patents 
and copyrights also is likely to call attention to two strategies that I have 
discussed more fully elsewhere that patent and copyright law currently 
deploy to reduce the costs of one-size-fits-all rights.127 First, both bodies of 
law use real options by placing conditions on the full enjoyment of these 
rights. These options force potential rights owners to self-sort, thereby 
reducing social costs by tailoring the number of entitlements granted and 
producing coarse-grained information about the private valuation of the 
entitlement. Patent law uses the strategy more vigorously, requiring an 
inventor to undergo examination prior to acquiring a patent128 and further 
requiring payment of maintenance fees at three intervals to retain rights 
during the full statutory duration of a patent.129 By placing an option filter at 
both the front and back ends of the patent term, the law causes many 
inventions that satisfy the statutory subject matter criteria either not to be 
patented or to enter the public domain prior to expiration of the full term of 
protection. 
 
126 See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 66, at 275. 
127 Carroll, One for All, supra note 15, at 878–900. 
128 See, e.g., Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 639 n.44 (2002) 
[hereinafter Long, Patent Signals] (listing several differing sources that estimate the 
range of production costs and noting that $20,000 is a conservative estimate). 
129 Utility patents that issue from applications filed on and after December 12, 1980, 
are subject to the payment of maintenance fees necessary to maintain the patent in force. 
Fees are due 3 1/2, 7 1/2 and 11 1/2 years from the date the patent is granted. 35 U.S.C. 
§ 41(b) (2006). A 6-month grace period is provided during which the maintenance fee 
may be paid with a surcharge. 37 C.F.R. § 1.362(e) (2005). Failure to pay the current 
maintenance fee on time may result in expiration of the patent. 37 C.F.R. § 1.362(g) 
(2005).  
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Regrettably, copyright law has abandoned the so-called “formalities” and 
renewable terms that served as analogous real options with regard to the 
acquisition and retention of the entitlement.130 All that remain are the 
registration requirement for initiating an infringement action with respect to a 
U.S. work and the conditional remedies tied to registration.131 For this 
reason, the problem of uniformity cost has intensified in copyright law. 
Second, when taken off the rack, a patent or a copyright appears to be 
only one size. But the fabric of both entitlements is elastic because the rights 
are defined by standards rather than rules. Thus, when measured by a court in 
the context of a particular case, the scope or size of a patent or copyright is 
necessarily tailored in some respects to conform often to industry-specific, 
technology-specific, or innovator-specific characteristics. Legal standards 
confer interpretive discretion on adjudicators. This interpretive discretion can 
be deployed ad hoc or systematically. With respect to the scope of 
intellectual property rights, courts can choose to use flexible doctrines to 
strike the incentives-access balance either on a per-work132 or per-invention 
basis, or more broadly along industry-specific or technology-specific 
lines.133 In the case of patent injunctions, for example, the flexibility in the 
standard for relief should lead to industry-specific patterns because of 
industry-specific differences in facts that are salient under the stand
Burk and Lemley argue that this is where the solution to the problem of 
uniformity costs lies—at least in patent law. In sum, they argue  
(1) that a purely unitary patent system no longer fits the extraordinarily 
diverse needs of innovators in today’s technology industries; (2) that the 
solution is not to split the patent system into industry-specific statutes, but 
to tailor the unitary patent rules on a case-by-case basis to the needs of 
 
130 Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 487–
88 (2004). 
131 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 411–12 (2006). 
132 One example of this form of tailoring is term extensions for individual patents. 
See Richard M. Cooper, Esq., Legislative Patent Extensions, 48 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 59, 
59–62 (1993) (reviewing this practice in the nineteenth century).  
133 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 110, at 1630–38 (arguing that courts should use 
this flexibility to resolve patent crisis); see also R. Polk Wagner, Of Patents and Path 
Dependency: A Comment on Burk and Lemley, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1341, 1345–48 
(2003) (discussing this distinction).  
134 See generally Michael W. Carroll, Patent Injunctions and the Problem of 
Uniformity Cost, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 421 (2007) (explicating this 
analysis); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Flexible Application of Injunctive Relief in Intellectual 
Property Enforcement (with Reference to Lessons from the Emerging US Jurisprudence), 
in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT (Edward Elgar, Xuan Li & Carlos M. Correa 
eds., 2009). 
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different industries; and (3) that it is the courts, not Congress or the PTO, 
that are best positioned to do this tailoring.135 
Finally, after acknowledging that uniformity cost is real, and regardless 
of weight given to the flexibility of standards, the proponent would further 
defend uniform rights for the following reasons. 
B. Administrative Cost  
The uniform rights proponent, acknowledging difficulties in measuring 
the total social costs of intellectual property rights, is likely to have an 
intuitive sense that evidence of robust intellectual property licensing activity 
combined with legal entrepreneurship to reduce transaction costs through 
innovative licensing structures means that the magnitude of uniformity cost 
is not significant enough to justify very much tailoring. Digging in a little 
deeper, the proponent is likely to argue that broadly defined uniform rights 
facilitate licensing and enforcement, and so the policy choice really is one 
between tailoring through public or private ordering. On this view, the 
intellectual property system is rendered more administrable through broadly 
defined rights. 
Some support for this point can be drawn from the work of Professors 
Henry Smith and Clarisa Long, who independently focus on information cost 
theory as relevant to the delineation of intellectual property rights. 
Acknowledging the theoretical case in favor of rewards or perfectly tailored 
rights,136 Professor Smith argues that once administrative cost enters the 
picture, broadly defined rights of exclusion perform better, rendering a 
complex innovation system wieldy by limiting the information required by 
officials entrusted to administer it.137 Drawing from his work on real 
property, Professor Smith argues that the law can deploy rights of 
“exclusion” or rights of “governance” with respect to resources, and that 
rights of exclusion create a modular system in which those who administer it 
must only attend to boundaries and need not gather information necessary to 
 
135 See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 112, at 5.  
136 Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property As Property: Delineating Entitlements in 
Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1748 (2007). 
137 Id. at 1748, 1764 (“Like other property rights, intellectual property rights provide 
simple ground rules as well as a platform for further contracting and for forming 
organizations.”); see also id. at 1798 (“It may well be that as overall complexity increases 
in the system of relations between actors using information, the modular feature of 
property permits a greater degree of overall complexity than do legal regimes more 
tailored to use.”). 
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govern activities taking place within the boundaries.138 This leads him to 
assert that “[t]he central empirical question in both property and intellectual 
property is when—and how easily—to overcome the basic presumption in 
favor of exclusion.”139 
There are a number of problems with this framing, and explanation of 
most of these are beyond the scope of this Article.140 But it is useful to 
acknowledge that included in the costs of transacting in or enforcing legal 
rights are the cognitive tasks associated with conceiving the transaction or 
the enforcement issue, and that broadly defined patents and copyrights may 
well reduce licensing and enforcement costs under certain circumstances. 
Along related lines, Professor Long argues that information goods have 
information cost profiles facing observers and owners that the law shapes and 
to which the law should attend.141 For example, she acknowledges that 
certain classes of patentable subject matter, such as business methods and 
software, are qualitatively different from the paradigmatic inventions that 
informed the structure of patent’s uniform rights, and she recognizes that 
tailoring might reduce the information costs associated with transactions and 
enforcement.142 She nevertheless concludes her analysis with a lukewarm 
defense of uniformity on the grounds that the trade-offs associated with 
tailoring rights may not be cost-justified on information-cost grounds.143 
It is important to note that Professors Smith’s and Long’s respective 
defenses of uniform intellectual property rights rely on a presumption based 
on a view about comparative administrative costs. However, each of them 
acknowledges that much turns on the evidence about the value of the 
underlying innovation and the relative costs and benefits of tailoring. It is 
likely that intuitions about how strong any presumptions in favor of 
uniformity are likely to differ, but the framework in Section V sets forth 
 
138 Id. at 1781–98. 
139 Id. at 1818. 
140 The largest problem stems from Professor Smith’s premise that the boundaries of 
patented inventions or copyrighted works of authorship are ascertainable to observers, 
owners or administrators in ways comparable to the boundaries of land or chattel 
property. For a salient critique on additional grounds, see Michael A. Carrier, Why 
Modularity Does Not (and Should Not) Explain Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 
POCKET PART 95 (2007), available at http://thepocketpart.org/2007/10/10/carrier.html; 
see also BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 77, at 40–42; Joshua D. Sarnoff, Abolishing the 
Doctrine of Equivalents and Claiming the Future After Festo, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1157, 1165–69, 1205–18 (2004). 
141 See Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 
465, 466–71 (2004). 
142 Id. at 546–47. 
143 Id. 
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standards for how and when such a presumption can be overcome on 
administrability grounds.  
1. Political Economy 
Certain considerations of political economy counsel in favor of 
uniformity as the default position for domestic policy. The strongest 
argument is that domestic uniformity disciplines or increases the costs of rent 
seeking by industries and other interest groups. Copyright and patent 
legislation serves for some as a paradigm public-choice case because such 
legislation generally is the product of bargaining among industry groups with 
little or no consumer representation.144 Commentators suggest that interest 
group involvement in copyright and patent legislation has intensified in 
recent years.145 
With uniform patents or copyrights, legislative change must submit to 
what Tom Olson calls the “iron law of consensus,”146 by which all industries 
affected by the law must agree for an amendment to pass through the many 
veto points in the legislative process. A recent example of the iron law in 
action was the American Association of Photographers’ successful campaign 
to torpedo an orphan works bill that had the support of the Copyright Office 
and all the other traditional interest groups active in copyright 
policymaking.147 
The argument then falls back. Even if a particular tailoring measure 
would have improved the efficiency of copyright law, legislative practice that 
would routinely grant additional rewards or create special carve-outs for 
individual interest groups would intensify the problems of rent-seeking 
already apparent in the process.148 
 
144 See, e.g., JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT: PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY ON THE INTERNET 35–65 (2001) (describing history of copyright legislation in 
the 20th century); William F. Patry, Copyright and the Legislative Process: A Personal 
Perspective, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 139, 141 (1996) (“In my experience, some 
copyright lawyers and lobbyists actually resent members of Congress and staff interfering 
with what they view as their legislation and their committee report.”). 
145 See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual 
Property Law, 1900–2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2234–36 (2000) (“There is abundant 
evidence that lobbyists are focusing more efforts on IP issues, and that industries with 
strong interest in IP issues are spending more.”). 
146 Thomas P. Olson, The Iron Law of Consensus: Congressional Responses to 
Proposed Copyright Reforms Since the 1909 Act, 36 J. COPYRIGHT SOC. 109, 117 (1989). 
147 ”Orphan Works” Bill Dies in Committee, National Press Photographers 
Association, News and Events, Sept. 27, 2006, http://www.nppa.org/news_and_events/ 
news/ 2006/09/orphan.html. 
148 See, e.g., Long, Uniform Patent System, supra note 10, at 48–49. 
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It is very important to note that the topic of geographic or international 
uniformity should be kept quite distinct from the political economy argument 
for uniform rights in domestic law. Evidence that would support the 
discipline argument for domestic legislative policy does not equally support 
the argument for international harmonization. On the contrary, the average 
level of exclusion needed in any particular economy will vary in part on the 
extent to which it is a net importer or exporter of goods or services 
embodying protected information.149 Thus, the push for international 
harmonization, which imposes the same average level of exclusion and is 
now encoded in the TRIPS agreement, is best understood as successful rent 
seeking spearheaded by multinational rightsholding corporations 
headquartered in the United States, Europe, and Japan. 
2. Summary 
The argument for designing intellectual property rights to apply 
uniformly to all protected subject matter—after tailoring to distinguish 
between patents and copyrights—and to apply uniformly to all rightsholders 
recognizes that in theory the rights should be tailored to the specific needs of 
specific innovators or tightly defined classes of innovator if granting 
intellectual property rights were the only strategy available for addressing the 
appropriability problem. The case for uniformity is grounded in pessimism 
about the practical possibilities for achieving this ideal. The case comes as a 
bad news/good news story. 
The bad news is that designing rights in a tailored fashion is not feasible 
because policymakers lack an evidentiary basis for tailoring, tailored rights 
are more complex and not cost-justified on administrative grounds, uniform 
rights impose political discipline on interest groups that would otherwise use 
their influence in a tailoring-friendly environment to successfully seek even 
greater rents than they currently receive. 
The good news is first that the markets that intellectual property rights 
enable have self-correcting features, such as: demand elasticity, price 
discrimination, and Coasean bargaining. These features enable private 
ordering to alter the initial design of intellectual property rights to better fit 
particular circumstances. Second, to the extent that transaction costs limit the 
scope of effective private ordering, some progress toward the theoretical 
ideal of tailored rights can be made when rights are defined as formally 
uniform while incorporating features that yield differential results in how the 
rights actually function. These features are option filters and standards.150 
 
149 See Suzanne Scotchmer, The Political Economy of Intellectual Property 
Treaties, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 415, 425–30 (2004). 
150 See supra Section III.A.2. 
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An option filter requires that the potential rightholder take some action in 
order to acquire or maintain protection under the right.151 So-called copyright 
“formalities,” patent examination, and patent maintenance fees all are such 
option filters that cause rightholders to reveal private information in the 
course of self-tailoring the effective reach of patents and copyrights.152 In 
addition, the legal standards that define the reach of patents and copyrights 
require considerable contextual information to apply. As a consequence, the 
incorporation of this contextual information causes administrators, courts, 
licensing attorneys, and others who must apply the rights to do so with some 
discernable differences across industries, technologies or classes of 
rightholder in particular settings. 
IV. TAILORED RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 
In a dynamic system, rules change in response to lessons rulemakers 
learn about the effects of prior decisions. The economic analysis of 
intellectual property law has thus far failed to supply a general information 
feedback framework for assessing and adjusting regulation, by, for example, 
tailoring the law. Indeed, the case for uniform intellectual property rights 
must confront the law as it is—the numerous multilateral treaties that specify 
minimum standards for patent and copyright law have tailored standards for 
certain subject matter, Congress has tailored rights granted by patent and 
copyright law in the United States along industry- or technology-specific 
lines in a number of instances, and the federal courts and relevant 
administrative agencies have further tailored the nominally uniform rights 
granted by patent and copyright law to apply differently with respect to 
certain kinds of invention and works of authorship.153 The argument for 
uniformity thus far developed acknowledges uniformity cost but reassures 
that the combination of private ordering and judicious deployment of options 
and standards has the matter well in hand. If that were true, however, what 
explains the motivation of international and national policymakers to further 
tailor patent and copyright law? 
A definition is in order. Most lawyers think of tailoring as legislative 
exceptions or alterations of general standards. But tailoring is not exclusively 
a matter of amending legislation. Instead, intellectual property law can be, 
and has been, tailored by (1) legislation, (2) judicial interpretation and 
evidentiary presumptions, and (3) administrative rules, statutory 
interpretation and adjudication. The point is important because judges and 
 
151 See supra Section III.A.2. 
152 See supra Section III.A.2. 
153 See generally Carroll, Law of Tailoring, supra note 11 (describing tailored 
patents and copyrights). 
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agency officials do not always view their interpretive practices as having the 
effect of tailoring the general standards of patent and copyright law, but in 
practice they have and, as the framework in Section V infra suggests, they 
should. In particular, the considerations of political economy within the 
framework suggest that judicial tailoring is likely to be the most efficiency-
promoting form of tailoring patent and copyright law. 
A. Congress  
Of course, tailoring rights by legislation is the most powerful form of 
adaptation since the legislature is the source of these rights. A few examples 
make the point. On the one hand, legislative tailoring in its most assertive 
form disaggregates information from patent or copyright and designates it as 
subject to sui generis rights.154 On the other hand, legislative tailoring, such 
as certain provisions of the Patent Act applicable to the term of patent for 
certain pharmaceutical drugs,155 is aimed at overcoming differential 
treatment caused by regulatory approval processes and making uniform the 
effective term of protection.156  
In addition, Congress has tailored patent law’s rights to exclude others 
from making, selling, offering to sell, using, and importing an invention in 
response to specific developments in certain industries. The provision with 
the greatest economic significance probably is the Hatch-Waxman Act’s 
immunity for a generic drug manufacturer’s use of a patented invention to 
pursue regulatory approval for a drug to compete with a patented drug six 
months prior to the patent’s expiration.157 Also significant is the Bayh-Dole 
Act, which permits grantees to pursue patent protection for inventions 
created with the support of federal funds but limits scope by providing the 
government with “march-in” rights. 158 This tailored measure is specifically 
aimed at reducing uniformity cost. Federal grantees face differential 
appropriability problems because the government has supplied both direct 
financial support and exclusive rights to induce the investment. Congress also 
 
154 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 901–14 (creating sui generis protection for semiconductor 
chip masks); see also Robert W. Kastenmeier & Michael J. Remington, The 
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984: A Swamp or Firm Ground?, 70 MINN. L. 
REV. 417, 438–44 (1985) (describing rationale for sui generis approach and legislative 
process from participants’ perspective). 
155 See 35 U.S.C. § 155 (2006). 
156 See Lunney, supra note 6, at 47–48.  
157 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2006). 
158 See id. §§ 200–12. 
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has tailored the scope of process patents for medical method claims and 
business method claims in response to perceived uniformity costs.159 
In the Copyright Act, Congress has tailored the scope of protection, 
primarily by replacing the right to exclude with statutory licenses for certain 
uses of certain classes of works. 160 Examples of these provisions include one 
that tailors rights in musical works to permit garage bands and other 
musicians the right to record cover versions of their favorite songs without 
the songwriter’s permission.161 Others tailor performance rights to permit 
cable and satellite companies to retransmit network television programming 
without prior consent of the copyright owners.162 In addition, for certain 
authors, such as recognized visual artists, Congress has granted additional 
rights,163 while for other classes of authors, such as architects164 and authors 
of sound recordings,165 Congress has limited the exclusive rights available. 
Similarly, Congress has limited the scope of rights in functional pictorial, 
graphical, or sculptural works.166 Congress also has tailored copyright scope 
by identifying certain privileged users, primarily librarians, educators, and 
Internet service providers, who enjoy certain additional limits on liability or 
available remedies.167 Recently, some commentators have remarked upon 
how underanalyzed these features of copyright law have been.168 
 
159 See id. §§ 287(c) (medical methods), 273 (prior inventor defense). 
160 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 111 (2006) (cable retransmission license), 114 (2006) 
(sound recording license); 115 (2006) (musical composition license), 119 (2006) (satellite 
retransmission license).  
161 See id. § 115. 
162 See id. §§ 111, 119. 
163 See id. § 106A. 
164 See id. § 120 (limiting rights of owner of copyright in an architectural work). 
165 See id. § 106(6) (limiting public performance right to performances by “digital 
audio transmission”). 
166 See 17 U.S.C. § 113 (2006). 
167 See, e.g., id. §§ 110 (privileging certain users of copyrighted works), 504(c)(2) 
(providing for remission of statutory damages for certain classes of users acting with a 
good faith belief of fair use), 512 (creating safe harbor from monetary liability for online 
service providers). 
168 See, e.g., Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 90 (2004); 
Timothy Wu, Copyright’s Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278, 366 (2005). 
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B. The Federal Courts  
Judicial tailoring is a built-in feature of intellectual property law.169 As 
described above, rights under patent and copyright have to be interpreted and 
applied in context, and therefore the rights always are tailored for particular 
subject matter to some degree. For purposes of this section, judicial tailoring 
requires more systematic differentiation in the application or interpretation of 
formally uniform rights. For example, copyright law treats books and source 
code as literary works, which can be infringed by other works that are 
“substantially similar” where there is evidence of copying.170 But the scope 
of how much expression the other work must borrow to fall within the zone 
of substantial similarity is noticeably different between the two types of 
literary work.171 
The effectiveness of judicial tailoring for making intellectual property 
law more context-sensitive depends on the dimension of rights being 
adapted. With regard to subject matter in copyright law, for example, courts 
have a certain amount of discretion to determine whether a work is 
sufficiently original172 or to draw the line between an unprotected idea and 
protected expression. Similarly, determining whether a process is 
protectable173 or whether a biological organism is a machine, a manufacture 
or composition of matter174 requires the exercise of interpretive discretion 
through which the courts can tailor protection.  
 
169 The role for judicial tailoring depends to some extent upon whether a legal 
system adopts the principle of stare decisis. In those systems that do, the binding nature 
of an appellate interpretation of a patent or copyright statute provides a court with a 
greater ability to tailor rights prospectively.  
170 See, e.g., Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 824 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(discussing summary judgment standard for substantial similarity in suit for infringement 
of children’s books by television series); Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1355–56 
(9th Cir. 1990) (same in screenplay setting); Computer Assoc. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 
982 F.2d 693, 701 (2d Cir. 1992) (setting forth substantial similarity test for source code).  
171 Compare Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1362 (“a court applying the extrinsic test must 
compare ‘the individual features of the works to find specific similarities between the 
plot, theme, dialogue, mood, setting, pace, characters, and sequence of events’”) (citation 
omitted), with Altai, 982 F.2d at 702–10 (applying abstraction-comparison-filtration 
methodology to find no substantial similarity). 
172 See, e.g., Trotter Hardy, The Copyrightability of New Works of Authorship: 
“XML Schemas” as an Example, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 855, 861–73 (2001). 
173 See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 
1375–77 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding methods of doing business to be patentable processes). 
174 See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980) (five Justice 
majority holding human-made bacteria not naturally occurring to be patentable subject 
matter). 
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As with subject matter, the scope doctrines under both patent and 
copyright law delegate to courts substantial discretion that can be exercised 
to tailor the balance of incentives and access for specific types of 
information. For example, Professors Dan Burk and Mark Lemley have 
argued in a recent book built upon a prior series of articles that uniformity 
cost is particularly high in relation to patent law’s application to software and 
biotechnology and that these costs can be reduced by judicial tailoring of the 
Patent Act.175 They further assert that the Federal Circuit already has applied 
the PHOSITA-based eligibility doctrines in technology-specific fashion to 
software and biotechnology inventions.176 They argue that the Federal 
Circuit has not explicitly chosen to tailor patent law in this way, but that it 
should.177 Others, however, disagree with their reading of the cases.178 
Leaving aside who has the better of the descriptive argument, it is clear that 
the flexible subject matter and scope standards described in Section III.A.2 
confer sufficient discretion upon the courts to reduce uniformity cost by 
fashioning rules or presumptions that apply to particular subject matter or 
classes of innovator where necessary. With regard to duration, however, the 
courts have little discretion to tailor the term of protection directly. 
Nonetheless, some commentators have shown that courts can use their 
discretion over scope to limit or enhance the effective duration of 
protection.179  
C. The PTO and the Copyright Office  
Administrative tailoring has been implemented to a limited degree. 
Administrative tailoring has greater potential effect in patent law because 
 
175 See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Biotechnology’s Uncertainty Principle, 54 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 691, 742 (2004) [hereinafter Burk & Lemley, Biotechnology’s 
Uncertainty Principle]; Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 110, at 1630–38. 
176 See Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 110, at 1593; Burk & Lemley, 
Biotechnology’s Uncertainty Principle, supra note 175, at 713–22. 
177 See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1194–95 (2002) (rejecting tailoring thesis as explanation for 
technology-specific case law); Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 110, at 1675–
95 (proposing judicial tailoring for biotechnology, chemical-pharmaceutical, software, 
and semiconductor inventions). 
178 See R. Polk Wagner, (Mostly) Against Exceptionalism, in PERSPECTIVES ON 
PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 367 (F. Scott Kieff ed., 2003); R. Polk 
Wagner, Comment: Exactly Backwards: Exceptionalism and the Federal Circuit, 54 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 749, 755–56 (2004). 
179 See, e.g., Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775, 799–800 
(2003); Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409, 409–10 
(2002). 
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protection does not commence until the PTO has issued a patent, and 
tailoring can be accomplished during the examination process. As with 
judicial tailoring, mere differential treatment—such as the issuance of patents 
for obvious software inventions because of the absence of prior art—does not 
amount to administrative policy to tailor the subject matter or scope of 
protection to better balance incentives and access. The PTO also arguably 
applies the Patent Act in tailored fashion. For example, evidence shows that 
potential patentees in certain industries encounter more demanding 
prosecution than others, and that this is a relatively recent development.180 
Indeed, the PTO=s examination guidelines for biotechnological inventions or 
business method patents reflect a tailored interpretation of the requirements 
of patentability.181  
In copyright law, Congress has delegated limited tailoring authority to 
the Copyright Office.182 For example, the Copyright Office’s determination 
that the deposit requirement for source code should be altered to enable 
copyright owners to enjoy both copyright and trade secret protection183 is a 
tailoring of copyright law’s disclosure function. The Copyright Office has 
made the judgment that incentives are more important than access for 
software and implemented that within the discretion granted by the 
Copyright Act.184 
The fact that patent and copyright law have been tailored by all three 
branches of government suggests that the case for uniform intellectual 
property rights has some weaknesses. Why have these policymakers tailored 
the law, and have these measures made the intellectual property strategy 
more efficient? We can separate causes and effects. The cause for tailoring by 
policymakers must be either a response to rent-seeking by special interest 
groups, an ignorant but well-intentioned response to perceived uniformity 
cost, or an informed response to real and substantial uniformity cost. The 
effects of these measures must be one of the following: (1) tailoring has 
increased the social costs of intellectual property rights by harming 
 
180 See Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 110, at 1589–90 (collecting 
sources). 
181 See John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method Patent Myth, 18 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 987, 1082 & n.263 (2003) (describing PTO initiative to give extra 
scrutiny to applications for inventions with International Patent Classification 705). 
182 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B)–(C) (2006) (exempting classes of users 
identified by Librarian of Congress through administrative rulemaking from 
paracopyright prohibition in § 1201(a)(1)(A)). 
183 See 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(c)(2)(vii) (2009); see also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 
COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION FOR COMPUTER PROGRAMS, CIRCULAR 61 2–3 (May 2005) 
(differentiating deposit requirement to permit redaction of trade secret material). 
184 See 17 U.S.C. § 408(c) (2006). 
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incentives, reducing access or imposing additional administrative cost with 
no offsetting benefit; (2) tailoring has not affected the social costs of 
intellectual property rights because the tailored rights are of relatively little 
economic significance or because the degree of tailoring is minor enough to 
be immeasurable; or (3) tailoring has made the intellectual property strategy 
more efficient by establishing a better fit between the appropriability 
problem and its solution either by accident or by design. 
The case for uniform intellectual property rights set forth thus far 
predicts that the motive to tailor is most likely a response to rent-seeking, and 
that the likely effects have been either to make matters worse or to be 
relatively meaningless. Grudgingly, the argument for uniformity would make 
room for the possibility that the government made the system more efficient 
out of dumb luck. But, perhaps, policymakers in the dynamic intellectual 
property system have made the law more efficient by responding to evidence 
of uniformity cost. Analysts currently lack a framework for assessing existing 
and proposed tailoring measures to ascertain their effects. 
V. A FRAMEWORK FOR TAILORING 
As the social costs of the intellectual property strategy have become 
more visible, it is clear that tailoring intellectual property rights to reduce 
uniformity cost is theoretically justified, and the means for tailoring are 
available. Because tailoring intellectual property rights can be difficult and 
costly, however, policymakers need a framework for analyzing when 
tailoring will enhance social welfare. This framework applies prospectively 
to pending and future legislative proposals and arguments for tailoring 
through judicial or administrative statutory interpretation and retrospectively 
to audit the tailoring statutory provisions or interpretations in existing patent 
and copyright law. 
This framework operates at a high level of generality, with the aim of 
focusing attention on the relevant types of evidence and argument that 
deserve attention regardless of the institutional setting for the tailoring 
analysis. This framework requires that three conditions be met for tailoring to 
be successful. First, the “knowledge corollary” to the ignorance justification 
for intellectual property rights must be satisfied. Policymakers must have 
sufficiently reliable information about eliminable uniformity costs. It is likely 
that tailoring will have to be done on an industry-specific or technology-
specific basis.185 Second, any measures to tailor intellectual property rights 
 
185 See Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research 
and Development, 1987 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783, 818 (“Since the 
impact of legal protection of intellectual property depends on the strength of other 
appropriability mechanisms and varies widely among industries, focused efforts to solve 
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so as to eliminate such uniformity costs should be administratively feasible 
and cost-effective—i.e., “administrable”. Finally, considerations of political 
economy should influence the final design of any tailoring proposal with 
respect to its institutional form. 
One goal of this framework is to separate the process of identifying 
inefficiencies in the operation of the intellectual property system from 
fashioning solutions. The first step in this analysis focuses on the kinds of 
economic evidence relevant for measuring the performance of the system. 
The second and third steps focus on high-level considerations necessary to 
fashioning a workable tailored solution to problems identified in the first 
step. However, this framework does not purport to be complete. In particular, 
further work is needed to analyze the relative information gathering and 
processing capacities of Congress, agencies and the courts concerning the 
operation of innovation and cultural policy. Similarly, further comparative 
analysis is needed to identify the relative strengths and weaknesses of each 
branch of government’s capacity to tailor intellectual property rights, taking 
into account a realistic understanding of the policy process. Finally, future 
work should also examine potential inter-branch collaboration to produce 
tailored solutions. For example, if courts lack access to legislative facts but 
have the greatest resistance to rent seekers, a revived Office of Technology 
Assessment in the executive branch might produce relatively unbiased 
reports that could inform judicial interpretation of patent and copyright law 
to take account of relevant industry-specific or technology-specific 
differences. I hope to wrestle with these issues in future work. 
A. Substantial Evidence of Uniformity Cost 
To satisfy the knowledge corollary, what kinds and how much evidence 
must a tailoring proponent adduce? The answer is that it depends upon the 
nature of the tailoring proposal and the degree of change for which it calls. 
This discussion assumes that tailoring proponents take a dynamic view of 
innovation and creativity, and that any proposal would be based on basic 
knowledge of the relevant rate and direction of activity in the innovative or 
creative fields that would be affected by the proposal, and that responsible 
tailoring proponents would acknowledge their level of uncertainty and 
anticipate the need for further adjustments through devices such as legislative 
sunsets or periodic review and reports by administrative agencies.  
Under this framework, the tailoring proponent’s burden increases in 
rough proportion to the degree that a proposal calls for disaggregation of 
rights. However, it is important not to overstate error costs. Recall that the 
 
problems in specific markets would be more prudent than a broad attempt to upgrade 
protection.”). 
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existing baselines in patent and copyright law rest on a great deal of 
uncertainty. Unless those likely to be affected by a tailoring measure can 
predict its impact on expected value with some certainty and predict that the 
effect will be different than the proponent claims, the risk of error associated 
with a tailoring proposal is not likely to be substantial.186 
Consequently, for a proponent to establish a prima facie case that 
tailoring is appropriate under the first element within this framework, the 
proponent need only adduce substantial evidence of identifiable uniformity 
cost. The substantial evidence standard is well established under the 
Administrative Procedure Act as evidence of a quantity and quality that “a 
‘reasonable mind might accept’ a particular evidentiary record as ‘adequate 
to support a conclusion.’”187 The quality and quantity of this evidence also 
will be relevant when assessing whether any added costs associated with 
administering tailored rights are justified, but these matters should be kept 
analytically distinct. Before we know when to tailor or whether existing 
tailoring promotes efficiency, we need a better idea for the kinds of evidence 
likely to support a particular case for tailoring. This subsection suggests the 
kinds of evidence likely to support a tailoring argument. The strength of that 
support varies with the scope of the proposal. 
1. Innovator Incentives—When Rights Are Wrong 
The premise underlying patent and copyright law—that creators or 
innovators must be able to exclude others in order to extract benefits from 
them to compensate for the costs of creation or innovation188—is 
demonstrably untrue in some cases. Innovative activity appears to have many 
complicated motivations, and society may receive the benefits of certain 
forms of innovation even without extending rights sufficient to induce a 
rational, selfish actor to innovate.189 Moreover, even when one holds firm to 
 
186 I thank Michael Abramowicz for this point. 
187 Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 162 (1999). 
188 See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property 
Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 994 (1997) [hereinafter Lemley, Economics of Improvement] 
(“In a private market economy, individuals will not invest in invention or creation 
unless . . . they can reasonably expect to make a profit from the endeavor.”). Some 
cultural innovators have been candid about their pecuniary motivations to create. See, 
e.g., TYLER COWEN, IN PRAISE OF COMMERCIAL CULTURE 18 (1998) (citing comments by 
Mozart and Charlie Chaplin among others). 
189 See, e.g., TERESA M. AMABILE, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF CREATIVITY 14–15 
(1983); TERESA M. AMABILE, CREATIVITY IN CONTEXT 153–77 (1996); Bruno S. Frey & 
Reto Jegan, Motivation Crowding Theory, 15 J. ECON. SURVEYS 589 (2001) (reviewing 
evidence that intrinsic motivation can be reduced by prospect of external reward); see 
also Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
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the rational actor thesis, in some cases anticipated prestige, notoriety or other 
“nonpecuniary income” would serve as a sufficient return on the investment 
to induce initial production in the absence of copyright or patent.190 
Alternatively, the investment in initial production may serve as a loss leader 
to increase other revenue streams, such as speaker’s fees.191 Finally, firms in 
a competitive economy are under constant pressure to innovate to 
differentiate their products and services from their competitors even without 
the promise of exclusive rights.192 
What are the types of patentable or copyrightable information that might 
get produced in sufficient quantity that rights could be tailored to exclude 
these classes from protectible subject matter or reduce the scope of rights? At 
this stage the bounds of the group can be stated intuitively, although research 
could improve this knowledge. The explosion of so-called “user generated 
content” on the Internet calls into question the premise that exclusive rights 
must be dangled as a lure to creation. Similarly, scholars and researchers do 
not receive royalties for their journal articles, and it is likely that they would 
continue to research and to write even without copyright in their articles 
because they receive direct compensation to do research and there are a 
variety of indirect benefits that flow from publication.193 In the world of 
patents, there’s a real question about whether the recent extension of patent 
rights to business methods was necessary on incentive grounds.194 
Using this kind of evidence to support a tailoring proposal may be 
difficult, however. One complication for the next stage of the analysis—
administrability—is that there may be no feasible way to differentiate 
 
1151, 1198–1204 (2007) (proposing a decentered model of creativity derived in part from 
empirical studies of creative processes and showing how copyright law could be 
judicially tailored in the context of narrative retellings). 
190 See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 110, at 1586 (describing 
alternative incentives to innovate). 
191 See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of 
Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 333 (1989) (describing forms of non-pecuniary 
income authors derive from publication). 
192 See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust 
Fosters Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 575, 590–92 (2007) (reviewing longstanding 
debate about how much incentive competition provides to innovate and situating antitrust 
law within this debate). 
193 See, e.g., Howard P. Tuckman & Jack Leahy, What Is an Article Worth?, 83 J. 
POL. ECON. 951, 951–52 (1975) (making the classic argument about indirect 
compensation from scholarship). Of course, copyright also stimulates investments in 
journal publication, and so any tailoring measure would have to take these incentives into 
account as well. 
194 See Michael Meurer, Business Method Patents and Patent Floods, 8 WASH. U. 
J.L. & POL’Y 309, 322–27 (2002). 
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between those who would have created or innovated in a particular field 
without the promise of exclusive rights and those who require such a 
promise. Compare and contrast for example, the numerous musicians who 
would compose and perform in a world without copyright with those creators 
driven by the thought of riches and fame underwritten by copyright.195 
Similarly, consider those free and open source software programmers 
motivated by nonpecuniary factors—and these are not all such 
programmers—and those who rely on a proprietary strategy as their 
motivation.196 With this kind of evidence of uniformity cost, the solution 
may be to place an option filter on otherwise uniform rights rather than seek 
to differentiate legislatively or judicially. Alternatively, policymakers could 
tailor the real options to apply only to certain classes of work.  
2. Alternative Appropriability Mechanisms 
Even for those creators and innovators who seek control over others’ use 
of their creations and innovations as a means of extracting compensation, 
patents and copyrights usually supplement a range of other tools or 
strategies. Evidence that these other tools are particularly effective or 
ineffective in light of relevant cost structures would tend to show that 
uniform intellectual property rights are misaligned. In particular, evidence 
related to the following alternative mechanisms is likely to be highly 
probative. 
a. Direct Cost Subsidies  
Although granting exclusive rights remains the dominant policy tool, the 
government also directly and indirectly subsidizes some forms of information 
production through grants, rewards, and tax incentives.197 In the United 
 
195 Cf. Susana Juniu, Ted Tedrick & Rosangela Boyd, Leisure or Work?: Amateur 
and Professional Musicians’ Perception of Rehearsal and Performance, 28 J. LEISURE 
RES. 44, 44 (1996) (finding marked differences between amateur and professional 
musicians toward rehearsal). 
196 See, e.g., Jürgen Bitzer, Wolfram Schrettl & Philipp J. H. Schröder, Intrinsic 
Motivation in Open Source Software Development, 35 J. COMP. ECON. 160, 160–61 
(2007); Joshua Lerner & Jean Tirole, Some Simple Economics of Open Source, 50 J. 
INDUS. ECON. 197, 197–99 (2002). 
197 Tax incentives can be used to spur investments in certain types of innovation—
e.g., development of uses for solar energy—or as an add-on incentive to existing 
intellectual property rights. See, e.g., Jacek Warda, Tax Treatment of Business 
Investments in Intellectual Assets: An International Comparison 13–19 (OECD 
Directorate of Sci. Tech. and Industry, Working Paper No. 2006/4, 2006) (cataloging tax 
incentives for R&D investments), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/ 
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States, the federal government funds approximately 25% of research and 
development, and in OECD countries, public sector investment approaches 
50%.198 Because the standard model recognizes that optimal protection must 
trade off solutions to the underproduction and underutilization problems, 
where the underproduction problem is solved through direct or indirect 
government investment, the level of protection should decrease to minimize 
deadweight losses from underutilization.199 Federal funding agencies have 
come under some pressure along these lines after some results show that 
these agencies did little to condition the use of patents arising from publicly 
financed research.200 
The Bayh-Dole amendments to the Patent Act201 are the clearest signal 
that policymakers are at least nominally responsive to evidence-based 
arguments concerning the effects of direct subsidies. Prior to 1980, federal 
grantees—primarily universities and research centers—faced uncertainty 
about seeking patent protection for inventions discovered under the auspices 
of a federal grant.202 Responding to arguments that commercializers lacked 
sufficient incentives to build on unpatented discoveries made by federal 
grantees, Congress made clear that these grantees could seek and receive 
patent protection subject to some tailoring of scope to reduce the social costs 
of monopoly under particular conditions.203 
 
53/4/36764076.pdf. 
198 See Menell & Scotchmer, supra note 16, at 1530–31. 
199 For an argument to this effect with respect to publicly financed biotechnology 
research, see Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of 
Biomedicine, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 290–91 (2003); see also John M. Golden, 
Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and Patentability: Natural Products and Invention in 
the American System, 50 EMORY L.J. 101, 109 (2001) (arguing that patent analysts often 
overlook the role of multibillion-dollar public investments in research in biotechnology 
industry). 
200 See, e.g., U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER NIH–
PRIVATE SECTOR PARTNERSHIP IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAXOL, REPORT TO THE 
HONORABLE RON WYDEN, U.S. SENATE 3 (June 2003) (finding that “NIH made 
substantial investments in research related to [cancer drug] Taxol, but its financial 
benefits from the collaboration with BMS [Bristol Meyers Squibb] have not been great in 
comparison to BMS’s revenue from the drug.”). 
201 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–12 (2006). 
202 See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 199, at 303–04 (describing situation in 1980). 
203 See id. at 304. The story Congress heard was that universities cared only about 
scientific recognition and were indifferent to patents, that private industry needed exclusive 
rights under university-owned patents to make product development profitable, and that 
government funding agencies had to be restrained from indulging their anti-patent reflexes so 
that universities and private industry could join forces to develop new technologies for the 
benefit of the U.S. economy. Id. 
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In response to these developments, the patent literature has seen the 
emergence of two related cottage industries. One is specifically focused on 
proposals to revise Bayh-Dole,204 and the other embraces a range of related 
proposals to tailor patent law for universities.205 The argument here is that 
the fact of direct subsidies is the kind of evidence likely to give rise to 
substantial uniformity cost because baseline patent rights are premised on an 
assumption that innovators need to recoup most of their costs in the market 
through the promise of monopoly pricing.206 
The focus of debate about university patenting should be on the source of 
uniformity cost. In what ways do the direct subsidies supply sufficient 
incentives for innovation? Are there gaps? If so, where? If the premise of 
Bayh-Dole is correct, would it be more effective to tailor the law to provide a 
limited commercialization right rather than patents to directly subsidized 
inventors? These are the kinds of economic analyses that the uniformity cost 
perspective suggests will most usefully inform debates about patenting by 
federally funded researchers inside and outside of the university setting. 
The other form of direct subsidy that should be squared with uniform 
intellectual property rights is prizes and rewards. As discussed above, direct 
 
204 See, e.g., DAVID C. MOWERY ET AL., IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL 
INNOVATION: UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER THE 
BAYH-DOLE ACT 166 (2004); Katherine J. Strandburg, Curiosity-Driven Research and 
University Technology Transfer, in UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER: PROCESS, DESIGN, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 93 (Gary D. Libecap ed., 
2005); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and 
Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1665–71 
(1996); F. Scott Kieff, Facilitating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and 
the Norms of Science—A Response to Rai and Eisenberg, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 691, 692 
(2001); Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, The Price of Progress: Are Universities Adding to the 
Cost?, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1373, 1412 (2007); Michael S. Mireles, Jr., States as Innovation 
System Laboratories: California, Patents, and Stem Cell Technology, 28 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1133, 1136 (2006) (characterizing Bayh-Dole as controversial); Rai & Eisenberg, 
supra note 199, at 289–91; Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual 
Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 147–51 (1999).  
205 See, e.g., Margo A. Bagley, Academic Discourse and Proprietary Rights: 
Putting Patents in Their Proper Place, 47 B.C. L. REV. 217, 217 (2006); Ron A. 
Bouchard, Balancing Public and Private Interests in the Commercialization of Publicly 
Funded Medical Research: Is There a Role for Compulsory Government Royalty Fees?, 
13 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 120, 125–26 (2007); Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent 
Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 622–24 (2008) (“The need 
for university patents, in short, depends critically on the technology at issue”); Kristen 
Osenga, Rembrandts in the Research Lab: Why Universities Should Take a Lesson from 
Big Business to Increase Innovation, 59 ME. L. REV. 407, 408–11 (2007); Elizabeth A. 
Rowe, The Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement: Do Universities Deserve 
Special Treatment?, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 921, 942–44 (2006).  
206 See, e.g., Menell & Scotchmer, supra note 16, at 1476–77. 
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compensation in the form of prizes or rewards is a well-established policy 
option.207 Many of the modern implementations of this option, however, use 
it as a supplement rather than a substitute for intellectual property protection. 
Should the government respond to the challenges of climate change by 
offering a $300 million prize for an improved car battery that will reduce 
carbon emissions, as presidential candidate John McCain proposed during 
the 2008 election season?208 Under the uniformity cost approach, one would 
ask what the evidence is that fluctuating fuel prices and other competitive 
circumstances do not already suggest that the value of a patent on such an 
invention would be sufficient to induce sufficient investments in this 
direction.209 
This is not to say that prizes or rewards should never be used as 
supplements to patent and copyright protection. The uniformity cost 
perspective suggests that this approach makes sense if uniform rights are 
insufficiently robust to attract certain types of creative or innovative activity. 
One caution, however, is that policymakers should also experiment with 
using prizes and rewards as substitutes for exclusive rights to ensure that they 
are not overcompensating innovators and creators. As a middle ground, 
policymakers might permit winners to pursue or to retain intellectual 
property rights but might either require that the government receive a license 
to use and to sublicense or require the winner to agree to pursue open 
licensing.210 
 
207 See supra Section II (discussing policy of using prizes and rewards as 
compensation for intellectual property rights). 
208 Michael Cooper, McCain Proposes a $300 Million Prize for a Next-Generation 
Car Battery, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2008, at A20. 
209 See, e.g., Jonathan Rauch, Electro-Shock Therapy, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, 
July/Aug. 2008, at 84 (describing General Motors’s aggressive approach to producing a 
battery-powered hybrid in response to eroding market share). 
210 A recent report by the National Research Council recommends that the National 
Science Foundation increase the number of innovation prize funds it administers, tailored 
to particular innovations, and that its policy toward intellectual property should be: 
We recommend that the federal government not seek to own or control the 
disposition of intellectual property developed by contestants in the course of seeking 
NSF innovation inducement prizes, with one exception. The exception would be that 
if the winner of a prize chooses not to put the winning innovation into commercial 
practice within a reasonable time period and if it declines to license it to another 
U.S.-based entity wishing to commercialize the invention, the winner would be 
required, as a condition of the award, to enter into good faith negotiations with the 
other party for a license to be awarded under terms and conditions typical for the 
industry or technology sector. 
INNOVATION INDUCEMENT PRIZES AT THE NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION: COMMITTEE 
ON THE DESIGN OF AN NSF INNOVATION PRIZE, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL 33 (2007). 
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b. Industry- or Market-Specific Features 
Lead time advantage and network effects are two market-specific 
economic phenomena that affect appropriability and innovator incentives and 
would therefore independently provide evidence relevant to a tailoring 
proposal.  
i. Lead Time 
Leadtime or first-mover advantage is the most common market-specific 
appropriability feature that could be the basis for tailoring. For at least some 
period of time, information will be excludable where its creation is 
unobserved and when the information has not been otherwise 
communicated.211 If the producer invests in information security procedures 
and measures, he or she can capitalize on this limited-duration excludability 
by being first to market with the goods incorporating the valuable 
information.212 During the lead time, then, the producer will be the sole 
source of the information good and will be able to charge supracompetitive 
prices before competitors acquire the good, reproduce it and enter the market 
with cheaper alternatives.213 Research indicates that the value of lead time 
often is industry-specific,214 and that in product markets with patentable 
goods incumbents often enjoy significant market share advantages even after 
competitors have entered a market.215 
The value of the lead-time advantage is affected not only by its duration 
but also by competitors’ copying costs. The competitor does not bear the 
 
211 See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD 
PATENT STATISTICS MANUAL 21–22 (2009). 
212 Trade secret law is concerned with keeping valuable information excludable 
where the producer does not to seek to sell the information directly. See, e.g., Jerome. H. 
Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2432, 2520–21 (1994). 
213 See Frischmann, Spillovers Theory, supra note 59, at 369 (“Lead time advantage 
is primarily dependent on secrecy, timing, and the ease of copying or reverse 
engineering.”). 
214 See generally William T. Robinson et al., First-mover Advantages from 
Pioneering New Markets: A Survey of Empirical Evidence, 9 REV. INDUS. ORG. 1 (1994) 
(surveying literature showing first-mover advantages, including industry-specific results). 
Of course, it is not an ironclad rule that being first is always best. See generally Marvin 
B. Lieberman & David B. Montgomery, First-Mover (Dis)Advantages: Retrospective and 
Link with the Resource-Based View, 19 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1111 (1998) (summarizing 
literature on relative first mover advantages). 
215 See Jonathan M. Barnett, Private Protection of Patentable Goods, 25 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1251, 1257 n.18 (2004). 
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costs of initial production, such as the time and effort to write a novel, and 
should therefore have marginally lower costs. The margin may not be that 
great where the competitor faces fixed costs of its own, such as the costs of 
rekeying a manuscript, or manufacturing and marketing competing goods. 
One study shows that imitation costs for patentable goods can run about 65% 
of the costs of innovation.216 However, about 70% of the goods studied were 
patented and “imitation costs” included the costs of inventing around the 
patent.217 Consequently, this data does not translate immediately into the 
costs of competition in markets without intellectual property rights. 
Additionally, when one accounts for the monetary value of time, reflected as 
a competitor’s opportunity costs, the necessary level of protection would be 
further reduced. If expected profits derived from this lead-time or first-mover 
advantage are sufficient to recoup the costs of initial production, the case for 
government intervention largely disappears.218 
However, evidence that the prospect of lead time profits provides 
sufficient incentives for creation or innovation is not by itself evidence of 
uniformity cost. Even in cases in which granting intellectual property rights 
is unnecessary because lead time supplies the right incentive, the rights 
would be merely superfluous and the social harm from uniformity would be 
negligible since this class of creator or innovator would enjoy market power 
even without the rights.219 Consequently, a tailoring proponent would need 
to further investigate evidence of lead time profits to determine whether 
exclusive rights effectively layer on an additional margin unnecessary to 
stimulate the desired levels of investment. The best case for tailoring based 
on lead time profits would be one in which intellectual property rights should 
be treated as superfluous on both sides of the ledger, but rightsholders use the 
rights to engage in strategic litigation that squeezes additional rents from 
competitors and consumers with no offsetting social benefits.220  
 
216 Edwin Mansfield et al., Imitation Costs and Patents: An Empirical Study, 91 
ECON. J. 907, 909–10 (1981). 
217 See id. 
218 See, e.g., Jerome H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright 
Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2504–05 (1994). One commercial publisher has 
decided to rely solely on its lead-time advantage for its line of books directed at open 
source programmers. See Steve Lohr, Steal This Book? A Publisher Is Making It Easy, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2003, at C4. 
219 Thanks to Michael Abramowicz for helping to sharpen this point in an email 
exchange. 
220 See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 77, at 130–38 (tallying the costs of patent 
litigation and the chilling effect that the risk of incurring such costs has on innovation). 
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ii. Network Effects 
A second market-based feature that might justify tailoring is the presence 
of strong network effects. A tailoring proponent relying on evidence of 
network effects would likely argue that a producer in a market with network 
externalities may have a number of ways to recoup the costs of initial 
production even in the absence of exclusive rights.221 As a general matter, 
these are effects that alter (usually increase) the value of a purchased good or 
service because others have chosen to purchase or use the same good or 
service. The classic example is the telephone. It becomes more valuable as 
others acquire them. Economists distinguish between markets involving 
actual networks, virtual networks, and positive feedback effects, and these 
distinctions could impact the strength of a tailoring proposal.222 
Evidence of network externalities may support shift from a property to a 
liability rule to provide a form of rate-of-return regulation of a “natural” 
monopoly.223 Unauthorized copying can serve to strengthen the market share 
of an information provider in a “tippy” market.224 Even where network 
effects are not strong enough to induce a desired level of investment in 
information production, network effects can amplify the market power that 
exclusive rights can confer.225 Professors Lemley and McGowan suggest that 
 
221 Network effects, as manifested by the “superstar” effect is a version of the 
phenomenon. See, e.g., Sherwin Rosen, The Economics of Superstars, 71 AM. ECON. 
REV. 845, 845 (1981). Although Rosen explains the skew distribution of popularity in the 
cultural sphere as reflecting a skewed distribution of talent in the population, id. at 846, a 
more convincing account would focus on the signaling function that certain forms of 
consumption play. Once momentum builds behind a particular book, movie, song, 
entertainer, athlete, or fashion design, consumers’ purchasing decisions will be 
influenced more by the importance of signaling membership in the herd than by any 
subjective evaluation of the good’s quality. See generally ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILLIP J. 
COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY: WHY THE FEW AT THE TOP GET SO MUCH MORE 
THAN THE REST OF US (1995). 
222 See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network 
Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 488 (1998). 
223 Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern 
Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 836 (2007). 
224 See VARIAN & SHAPIRO, supra note 120, at 45; Lisa N. Takeyama, The Welfare 
Implications of Unauthorized Reproduction of Intellectual Property in the Presence of 
Demand Network Externalities, 42 J. INDUS. ECON. 155, 165 (1994) (“Once the network-
enhancing effect of the copies is taken into account, not only can copying lead to greater 
firm profits, it can produce a Pareto improvement in social welfare, despite the absence of 
indirect appropriation.”). 
225 See Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 188, at 1066–67 (stating 
that intellectual property rights reinforce market power where there are strong 
standardization effects). 
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evidence of a market exhibiting strong network effects because of demand 
for standardization may support proposals to permit reverse engineering to 
allow competitive entry.226 Patent law currently does not recognize a reverse 
engineering defense, although some scholars have offered proposals either 
for a generalized fair use defense that could be adapted to market 
circumstances227 or more tailored proposals to permit reverse engineering. 
Evidence of strong network effects pose one particular challenge to 
tailoring proponents, however. If network effects, coupled with exclusive 
rights confer substantial market power, is tailoring intellectual property rights 
superior to policing abuses of such market power through competition law? 
The answer to this question is difficult because antitrust doctrine is in flux. A 
number of scholars have advanced arguments about the appropriate 
relationship between intellectual property and antitrust,228 but further 
discussion of that intersection is beyond the scope of this Article. In any 
event, a tailoring proponent would have to account for the role of antitrust in 
network markets, and, if the law were to move in the direction some of these 
theories suggest, it may be more efficient to leave uniform intellectual 
property rights in tact and to adapt their actual reach through judicial 
application coupled with enforcement under competition law. 
3. Overlapping Rules and Rights 
Two common legal features that intellectual property owners factor into 
their appropriability calculus is the availability of other legal rights of 
exclusion, such as trade secret, trademark, or contract law, and regulatory 
requirements in the marketing and distribution of creations or innovations. 
Patent and copyright law already have been tailored to respond to these 
features in some respects. For example, with respect to overlapping rights, 
Professor Jerry Reichman has pointed out, trade secret law provides a 
liability-rule substrate to the property-rule regimes of patent and 
copyright.229 
As important, product differentiation strategies supported by trademark 
law supply an important source of power over price. The effects of trademark 
and trade secret protection may be sufficient to induce the desired level of 
 
226 See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 222, at 525, 527.  
227 See Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1249–50 (2000); see also Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne 
Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1638 
(2002). 
228 See Baker, supra note 192, at 575 (collecting sources). 
229 See Reichman, supra note 218, at 2438–41 (explaining liability rule structure of 
trade secret law). 
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investment even in the absence of copyright or patent rights in some 
cases.230 Moreover, the exclusivity provided by copyright or patent rights 
facilitates the producer’s ability to establish strong, highly distinctive 
marks.231 This effect likely explains why consumers continue to purchase 
branded over-the-counter drugs such as Tylenol® or Advil® at a significant 
premium even when they have available cheaper generic drugs that are 
chemically perfect substitutes.232 In markets in which this effect is 
particularly strong, the level of protection may be reduced by, for example, 
reducing the term of protection without significantly reducing the incentive 
effects the protection supplies. One might similarly analyze the presence or 
absence of effective technological controls that perfect excludability in the 
absence of
In addition to overlapping rights, the pharmaceutical industry faces 
overlapping regulation because to take a patented medicine to market, a firm 
must satisfy health and safety standards as well as the standard for 
patentability.234 The health and safety regulatory process diminishes the 
effective period of market exclusivity offered by the patent.235 Patent law 
already has been tailored in response in two ways. The term of patent 
protection can be extended based on regulatory delay,236 but also generic 
entry at the end of patent protection has been facilitated by Hatch-
 
230 See F. Scott Kieff, Coordination, Property and Intellectual Property: An 
Unconventional Approach to Anticompetitive Effects and Downstream Access, 56 EMORY 
L.J. 327, 432–34 (2006) (arguing that trademark, and to a lesser extent patent, could 
provide entertainment industry sufficient incentives even without copyright). 
231 Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of 
Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1457 (2002) (“Those who actually use 
intellectual property protection, however, appreciate that its various modalities can be 
combined to yield important synergies: Patents can help create goodwill, and trademarks 
can be used to appropriate the gains from innovation.”). 
232 Robert Barsky, Mark E. Bergen, Shantanu Dutta & Daniel Levy, What Can the 
Price Gap Between Branded and Private-Label Products Tell Us About Markups?, in 
SCANNER DATA AND PRICE INDEXES 165, 218–22 (Robert Feenstra & Matthew Shapiro 
eds., 2003) (showing that branded analgesics enjoy a high markup over generic 
competitors). 
233 Such an analysis is complicated by the presence of exclusive rights in the use of 
access and copy controls. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006). 
234 See supra note 27.  
235 Outlook 2009, TUFTS CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF DRUG DEV., OUTLOOK 2009 1 (Jan. 
2009) (reporting that regulatory approval for new drugs averaged 1.1 years during 2005–
2007 but that combined approval and clinical phase time was about 8 years), available at 
http://csdd.tufts.edu/InfoServices/OutlookPDFs/ Outlook2009.pdf. 
236 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 155–56 (2006). 
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Waxman.237 The pharmaceutical industry has deployed two strategies to 
extend the period of monopoly on a patented medicine. First, it has chosen to 
appropriate the limited exclusive right that the law offers to first-moving 
generic manufacturers.238 Second, it has sought and obtained a new exclusive 
right on the clinical trial data necessary for regulatory approval of generic 
equivalents of patented medicines. This tailored right of “data exclusivity” 
has been written into bilateral “free trade” agreements between the United 
States and a number of trading partners, and in the European Union.239 
4. Fragmentation and Market Failure 
The flipside of overlapping rights are rights that are too finely grained to 
support the innovative investments or activities in a particular industry or 
context. In such cases, problems of anticommons may emerge. Tailoring 
proponents may propose measures that consolidate rights, increase 
limitations or exceptions to the rights, or tailor remedies to offer only liability 
rule protection of the rights. 
5. Demand-Side Features—Positive Spillovers 
Even if uniform rights suited information producers to a tee, a good 
argument for tailoring rights could be derived from evidence of certain 
positive externalities, or spillovers, on the demand side. Professors Brett 
Frischmann and Mark Lemley argue separately and together that efficient 
patent and copyright law must be limited and leaky in order to encourage or 
allow certain types of uncompensated demand-side sharing of valuable 
information.240 Their arguments call for tailoring to ensure that the law is 
particularly permissive with respect to patented or copyrighted information 
that functions as “infrastructure.”241 In particular, Frischmann argues that 
 
237 See Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1058 n.2 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(describing purpose of Hatch Waxman Act, as amended). 
238 See id. at 1058 (vacating FTC order finding such a settlement to be anti-
competitive). 
239 See, e.g., Carlos M. Correa, Implications of Bilateral Free Trade Agreements on 
Access to Medicines, 84 BULL. OF WORLD HEALTH ORG. 399, 401 (2006), available at 
http://www.scielosp.org/scielo.php?pid=S0042-96862006000500021&script=sci_ 
arttext&tlng=en.  
240 See Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons 
Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 922–23 (2005) [hereinafter Frischmann, Economic 
Theory]; Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 66, at 257, 282.  
241 See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 66, at 271. 
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information should be managed as a commons rather than through private, 
exclusive rights when:  
(1) The resource may be consumed nonrivalrously; (2) Social demand for 
the resource is driven primarily by downstream productive activity that 
requires the resource as an input; and (3) The resource may be used as an 
input into a wide range of goods and services, including private goods, 
public goods, and nonmarket goods.242 
Patent and copyright law already reflect this view, in part, through 
general exclusions of protection for ideas or facts (in the case of copyright) 
or discoveries of products of nature (in the case of patent).243 But some 
information that would fall within the subject matters of patent and 
copyright, respectively, also may function as nonrivalrous, generic inputs 
that supply social and public goods, such as public health or public 
education, for which markets are either absent or incomplete. In such cases, 
“the opportunity cost of an exclusive right may be greater than its 
benefit.”244 In these cases, the argument for solving the appropriability 
problem through some combination of prize, reward, or tax strategy is likely 
to be pa  
Alternatively, where the evidence shows that patented or copyrighted 
information serves as an input to a range of private and public goods, a 
tailoring proponent may seek to propose limitations or exceptions for the 
producers of public goods while leaving exclusive rights intact as against the 
producers of private goods. Much of the recent commentary calling for a 
revitalized experimental use exception to patent infringement or for tailoring 
of patent law with respect to university researchers follows this line.245 The 
proponent should also be prepared to answer the argument advanced by 
Professor Polk Wagner that even “complete” rights of exclusion are unable to 
prevent positive spillovers, and—to the extent that more robust, uniform 
rights encourage production of additional information—the total amount of 
spillovers will increase with broad exclusive rights.246 In my own view, even 
 
242 See Frischmann, Economic Theory, supra note 240, at 956. 
243 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2004) (excluding ideas from subject matter of 
copyright).  
244 Lawrence Lessig, Re-Marking the Progress in Frischmann, 89 MINN. L. REV. 
1031, 1035 (2005) (recasting Frischmann’s argument). 
245 See, e.g., Ted Hagelin, The Experimental Use Exemption to Patent Infringement: 
Information on Ice, Competition on Hold, 58 FLA. L. REV. 483, 523–40 (2006) (collecting 
sources and summarizing range of law reform proposals for experimental use). 
246 See R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and 
the Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 995 (2003). 
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setting aside distributional concerns, I am skeptical about the degree to which 
increases in a rightsholder’s power of exclusion beyond a certain point 
induce increased production and distribution of useful information, but the 
tailoring proponent should be prepared with a more detailed argument along 
these lines. 
6. Industrial Innovation Decision Structures 
Economic analysis to date suggests that the magnitude of appropriability 
problems varies by industry,247 and we would therefore expect that tailoring 
proposals are likely to call for line drawing along industry lines. In prior 
work, Professors Robert Merges, Richard Nelson,248 and Professor Tim 
Wu249 independently suggest that policymakers should recognize the effect 
on industry structure and degree of competitive entry influenced by the 
subject matter and scope of intellectual property rights and that policymakers 
should tailor rights to modulate the degree of entry depending upon industry 
maturity and other competitive conditions.  
Merges and Nelson made a significant contribution to the patent 
literature first by calling attention to the role courts must play in tailoring the 
scope of patents through application of the law’s flexible scope doctrines and 
second by “show[ing] that the issues at stake regarding patent scope depend 
on the nature of technology in an industry. This dependence includes two 
characteristics: the relationship between technical advances in the industry, 
and the extent to which firms license technologies to each other.”250 
By studying and categorizing the effects of patent scope on follow-on 
invention, Merges and Nelson generally reject the “prospect” theory of patent 
scope that would delegate control over follow-on innovation to early 
inventors in favor of greater entry tailored to the characteristics of what they 
label “cumulative technologies,” “chemical industries,” and “science-based 
industries.”251 They argue that the PTO and courts should be attentive to the 
dynamic development of technology within specific industries or fields of 
invention and recognize that their respective decisions about patent scope 
also have dynamic effects.  
Professor Wu makes a related argument concerning the role that the 
presence or absence of intellectual property rights and the delineation of their 
 
247 See supra Section V.A.2.b. (discussing industry-specific appropriability 
problems). 
248 See generally Merges & Nelson, supra note 115.  
249 See generally Wu, supra note 65.  
250 Merges & Nelson, supra note 115, at 843. 
251 See id. at 908–16 (summarizing conclusions). 
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scope will shape the “decision architecture” for innovation within particular 
industries. In short, he argues that where intellectual property rights are 
robust, innovation decisions are likely to be made within hierarchal firms that 
own these rights, and the willingness of these firms to grant licenses to 
follow-on innovators who may become competitors is suspect.252 In contrast, 
where intellectual property rights are subject to significant limitations or 
exceptions, innovation decisions are likely to be made polyarchically.253 He 
argues that policymakers should employ presumptions that favor limited 
intellectual property rights in new industries to favor decentralized 
development unless the risk of misappropriation is so significant that 
investments in new development will be deterred.254 In contrast, he argues 
that policymakers should be more solicitous of claims for more robust rights 
applicable to “dead” industries unless overpropertization was one of the 
causes of death.255 
The take-away from this work is that policymakers should be receptive 
to tailoring arguments that rely on industry-wide evidence concerning the 
effects of intellectual property rights on the pace and direction of innovation. 
This evidence and the decisions that it supports will be most significant when 
an industry of field or endeavor is in its early stages. Professors Merges and 
Nelson stress the importance of rewarding pioneers with relatively broad 
patents, but they and Professor Wu also show that the PTO, the Federal 
Circuit, and Congress should guard against overreaching by early innovators 
who are likely to use the control that robust intellectual property rights confer 
to choke off socially beneficial follow-on innovators. 
7. Summary and Examples 
Decisions about intellectual property policy should be evidence-based. 
Judge Posner is correct to say that gathering and assessing evidence about the 
performance of uniform patents and copyrights is difficult. But gathering and 
assessing evidence about the social costs of uniform rights and how these 
could be tailored to perform better is far more plausible and effective. This 
should be a primary focus for the economic analysis of intellectual property. 
The types of evidence most likely to support a tailoring proposal are those 
showing innovator incentives that depart from the standard rationale for 
 
252 Wu, supra note 65, at 140–41. 
253 See id. at 143–45 (“The analysis here suggests that copyright and patent 
exceptions have a particular urgency when they can open markets to decentralized 
improvement without permitting misappropriation of the primary owners’ investments.”). 
Id. at 145. 
254 See id. at 145. 
255 See id. at 146–47. 
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intellectual property rights, the availability of alternative appropriability 
mechanisms, the role of overlapping legal rights that influence 
appropriability, the magnitude of positive spillovers generated by certain 
types of innovative activity, and industry-specific effects on follow-on 
innovation from uniform rights. 
A few recent examples of tailoring debates highlight the relevance of this 
evidentiary taxonomy. The availability of alternative appropriability 
mechanisms, lead time in particular, is the focus of a current policy debate 
concerning fashion design. A group of fashion designers have petitioned 
Congress for a sui generis three-year right of exclusivity on the grounds that 
globalized markets and the Internet have eroded the designer’s traditional 
lead-time advantage.256 They assert that factories in India use photographs 
taken when new lines of clothing are first displayed and have knock-offs in 
the stores before the designers have even shipped their own lines.257 Some 
members of Congress agreed to introduce legislation creating a sui generis 
right for apparel, bags, belts, and eyeglass frames. 
Evidence of erosion of lead time is not by itself sufficient evidence to 
support a tailored measure of this sort. Proponents must provide evidence 
that the erosion of lead time reduces investment incentives below desired 
levels. Critics of the Design Piracy Prohibition Act argue that successful 
designers still enjoy sufficient rewards to provide sufficient incentives to 
create and that the social costs of the proposed expansion of intellectual 
property rights would mire the industry in socially wasteful litigation without 
any offsetting benefits in “better” or more fashion designs.258 
In a related vein, Professors Michael Abramowicz and John Duffy 
implicitly incorporate the evidentiary framework proposed herein to argue 
that the economic incentives provided by lead-time advantage may be 
systematically insufficient to reward otherwise unpatentable market 
experimentation. Their model suggests that the subject matter of intellectual 
property law should be tailored to reward commercialization rather than 
invention where lead time is insufficient to induce optimal market 
experimentation. Using new business models, such as that of Netflix, as an 
 
256 Memorandum from Jessica G. Jacobs, Law Clerk, Am. Law Div., Copyright 
Protection for Fashion Design: A Legal Analysis of the Design Piracy Prohibition Act, 
H.R. 2033 6 (June 28, 2007), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RS22685_ 
20070628.pdf (last visited July 27, 2008). 
257 See Susan Scafidi, F.I.T.: Fashion as Information Technology, 59 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 69, 87 (2008) (“While the immediate online availability of photographs of new 
styles from the runway or the red carpet contributes to consumer interest in cutting-edge 
fashion, it also enables design pirates to offer fast, cheap knockoffs—often before the 
original versions are available in stores.”). 
258 See, e.g., James Surowiecki, The Piracy Paradox, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 24, 
2007 (“There’s little evidence that knockoffs are damaging the business.”). 
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example, they then admit that drawing an administrable line to cover 
unobvious commercialization efforts is likely infeasible without development 
of new institutions.259 
Evidence of the power of overlapping rights can be found in the power 
that the PENGUIN CLASSICS mark gives Penguin Group, USA in the 
market for books in the public domain.260 Even in the absence of copyright 
protection, publishers find it profitable to invest in competing publications. 
In addition to the power of brand recognition, the inducements for these 
investments in the absence of copyright protection are that the investment is 
less risky because the status of these books as “classics” demonstrates some 
demand, and network effects magnify the demand as these books become 
required reading in secondary school and “must-read” items for adult book 
groups. 
In at least one policy debate, however, the availability of alternative 
protection through trade secret and contract and other means has been taken 
into account. For more than a decade, compilers of non-copyrightable 
databases have sought special legislation to give them sui generis exclusive 
rights.261 They made their case successfully to the European Commission,262 
but have thus far failed to persuade the United States Congress.263 The 
Commissioners appear to have a certain amount of buyer’s remorse.264 
B. Administrability 
Tailored provisions of the law succeed when the distinctions drawn are 
jurisprudentially stable and administratively cost-effective. I combine these 
 
259 See Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market 
Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337, 410 (2008) (“A likely reason for the law’s 
relative lack of attention to market experimentation is that the relevant institutional 
players, such as patent examiners, legislators, and judges, are not well positioned to make 
judgments about which market experiments deserve protection.”). 
260 See Bill Goldstein, Publishers Give Classics a Makeover, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 
2003, at C9. 
261 See Daniel J. Gervais, The Protection of Databases, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1109, 
1139 (2007) (describing and analyzing the international and national protection of non-
original databases in United States and Europe). 
262 See Council Directive 96/9, Legal Protection of Databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20–
28 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi! 
celexapi!prod! CELEXnumdoc&numdoc31996L0009&model=guichett&lg=en.  
263 See Gervais, supra note 261, at 1142. 
264 Internal Market Services Directorate General, First Evaluation of Directive 
96/9/EC on the Legal Protection of Databases 23–25 (Comm’n of the European Cmtys., 
Working Paper, 2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/ 
databases/ evaluation_report_en.pdf.  
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two measures into the metric of administrability. If the economic evidence 
from the first step of the analysis shows that uniformity cost is particularly 
problematic with respect to certain subject matter, a particular industry, or a 
particular class of innovator, such as employees of universities, then the legal 
analysis turns to the question of institutional form.  
This is the part of the analysis for which lawyers are uniquely qualified. 
The administrative costs of intellectual property schemes are incurred largely 
in domains dominated by lawyers. These costs include bargaining costs, such 
as the costs of drafting licenses, litigation costs, and, in the case of patent, 
prosecution costs. These costs matter. For example, the substantial costs of 
patent prosecution and litigation reduces the expected value from a patent 
because there will be some markets in which the surplus available is small 
enough that obtaining or enforcing exclusive rights will not be cost-
justified.265 Inventors faced with such costs may choose not to invest in 
socially beneficial innovation or may opt for trade secret protection where 
the disclosure given by an issued patent would be preferable. 
Turning now to the proponent’s burden, once specific uniformity costs 
have been identified, the proponent must also show that it would be 
administratively feasible to tailor rights and that doing so would be cost-
justified. Demonstrating feasibility means showing (1) that the law can 
adequately delineate the subject matter governed by tailored rights and (2) 
that such distinctions will be stable enough in practice to defeat arbitrage by 
clever attorneys.266  
If tailored rights result in significantly differential treatment of works 
under copyright law or inventions under patent law, parties would have an 
incentive to characterize works in a less protected category as works 
belonging to a category with greater protection.267 Along these lines, the 
 
265 See Lanjouw & Lerner, supra note 77, at 215–16 (surveying empirical literature 
showing reduction in patent value from high enforcement costs). 
266 The few economists who have considered the matter are relatively optimistic 
about the stability of tailored protections. See, e.g., Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, 
Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?, in 2 INNOVATION POLICY & 
THE ECONOMY 51, 53, 71 (Adam Jaffe, Joshua Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2002) 
(“[I]ntellectual property regimes should be designed so that the subject matter of each 
one has relatively homogeneous needs for protection.”). 
267 The phenomenon of legal arbitrage is most familiar in the context of applying 
intellectual property laws to new technologies. See, e.g., NBC v. Satellite Broad. 
Networks, Inc., 940 F.2d 1467, 1471 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that satellite television 
network was a “cable system” eligible to retransmit broadcast television programs under 
a statutory license) (superseded by regulation); Satellite Broad. and Commc’n. Ass’n v. 
Oman, 17 F.3d 344, 348 (11th Cir. 1994) (upholding Copyright Office regulation 
rejecting satellite system eligibility for “cable system” license); see also 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 119, 122 (2000) (providing separate statutory licenses for satellite retransmissions of 
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Court’s holding in J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, 
Inc.268 can be viewed as successful legal arbitrage of the statutory distinction 
drawn for patent protection of plants and plant varieties.269 The 
manipulability of language does have its limits however, and relatively stable 
definitions of subject matter are possible. Consider, for example, the distinct 
treatment that “musical works” and “sound recordings” receive under 
copyright law.270 
It is important to stress the pragmatism necessary for the jurisprudential 
stability inquiry. A tailoring opponent cannot defeat a proposal merely 
because a proposed distinction is not watertight. Most legal distinctions leak. 
The pragmatic question in assessing whether the boat can stay afloat is how 
bad the leaks are likely to be. Consider the case of patents in methods of 
doing business. Congress already has tailored patent law by creating a 
defense specific to patents teaching a “method of doing or conducting 
business.”271 How stable is this category? According to Professors Allison 
and Tiller, not very. They argue: 
Although it is not entirely unheard of for Congress to single out a particular 
field for different protective scope under patent law, it is quite rare. In 1996, 
Congress granted immunity to medical practitioners and health-care entities 
so that they are no longer liable for infringing medical and surgical 
procedure patents. That action by Congress has been criticized, though not 
widely, because of the difficulties likely to be encountered in defining 
“medical or surgical procedures.” Even if one believes that it was socially 
optimal to remove the threat of an infringement action so as to give 
physicians the freedom to use any procedure they choose, it is unlikely that 
a reasonable estimate of costs and benefits would lead to the same 
conclusion for business methods. Business practices lack the social 
imperative of medical treatments. Moreover, treating different technologies 
differently places too great a premium on ex ante definitions, such that the 
definitional scheme will be at least partially defeated because of the 
significant transaction costs associated with attorney efforts to opt into or 
 
broadcast signals). 
268 534 U.S. 124, 145–46 (2001). 
269 See, e.g., Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-577, 840 Stat. 
1542 (codified in various sections within 7 U.S.C. § 2321); Plant Patent Act of 1930, 35 
U.S.C. §§ 161–64 (1994 & Supp. 2000); Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179 
(1995) (rejecting Federal Circuit’s “crop-by-crop” reading of the PVPA). TRIPS Article 
27.3 permits adherents to adopt sui generis protection for plant varieties. 
270 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 (2006) (definitions), 106 (2006) (providing differential 
public performance rights to owners of copyrights in musical works and sound 
recordings). 
271 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2006). 
2009] ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL 1427 
 
 
                                                                                                                  
out of a definition by carefully tailoring invention descriptions and patent 
claims.272 
Allison and Tiller’s assertions are insufficient to make the case that a 
tailoring proposal with respect to business methods must fail on the grounds 
of administrability. Assume for the moment that a proponent has shown that 
patents on business methods generate substantial uniformity cost either 
because they exist or because of their scope. What is the likely magnitude of 
transaction costs associated with attempted legal arbitrage? How likely are 
those attempts going to succeed? The first point to keep in mind is that this 
inquiry is specific to the tailoring proposal that emerges from the first step of 
the inquiry. 
A principle of proportionality governs the relationship between the first 
and second steps of the inquiry: The larger the distinction drawn by a 
proposal, the more pressure that distinction must be able to endure. With 
respect to business methods, if the proponent is merely trying to promote the 
prior user defense in Section 273,273 the risk of legal arbitrage is relatively 
low because a court engaged in the ex post infringement inquiry should be 
able to assess whether a particular method claim is of the sort that motivated 
the distinction. 
What if, instead, Congress or the Federal Circuit were to disaggregate 
business methods from patentable subject matter, perhaps by reinstating de 
jure what was once a de facto limit on business method patents prior to the 
Federal Circuit’s decision in State Street Bank?274 Professors Allison and 
Tiller are right to predict that under such a rule, patent prosecutors would 
engage in clever drafting to avoid the subject matter bar. But the relevant 
question is what would their likelihood of success be, factoring in a 
reasonable period of time for the courts and the PTO to gain experience to 
apply the distinction? Are there types of method claims that could be 
disguised more readily than others such that the tailoring proponent might be 
forced to amend the proposal to exclude only a subset of business method 
patents on administrability grounds? Some evidence relevant to these 
questions could be drawn from the experience in Europe, and perhaps in 
particular in the United Kingdom, which explicitly tailors patentable subject 
matter to exclude business methods.275  
 
272 Allison & Tiller, supra note 181, at 1020–21 (internal citations omitted) 
273 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2006). 
274 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998). 
275 See Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 52(2)(c), Oct. 5, 1973, 
1065 U.N.T.S. 199 (tailoring patentable subject matter to exclude “schemes, rules and 
methods for performing mental acts, playing games or doing business, and programs for 
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Whether business methods are patentable subject matter remains a 
relevant question even after the recent course correction by the en banc 
decision of the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorori in 
In re Bilski.276 In Bilski, the Federal Circuit was asked by various amici to 
interpret the criteria for patentable processes to exclude methods of doing 
business277 or software.278 Rejecting these arguments for the time being, the 
court chose instead to tailor patentable subject matter at what appears to be a 
higher level of abstraction. Acknowledging that some form of tailoring would 
be required because not every process could be eligible for patent 
protection,279 the court resolved to limit method patents to those that pass the 
“machine-or-transformation” test.280 
The court explicitly left open the likelihood of future judicial 
development through which categories of excluded subject matter may 
emerge.281 This Article’s framework suggests an analytical guide for the 
Supreme Court’s review and future developments that follow therefrom. 
Moving to the next stage of the inquiry, demonstrating that tailored rights 
are cost-justified requires attention to the costs of complexity,282 impacts on 
licensing, and litigation as the parties and the courts incur greater education 
 
computers”); Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, § 1(2) (Eng.), available at http://www.ipo.gov. 
uk/2006ewcaciv1371.pdf (excludes same patentable subject matter and announces a new 
administrative procedure to implement the Aerotel judgment, noting that “[i]t is the 
Office’s view that the change in approach does not fundamentally change the boundary 
between what is and is not patentable in the UK although we recognise that there will 
inevitably be the odd case right on the boundary that may be decided differently under 
different tests.”); see also Aerotel Ltd. v. Telco Holding Ltd. [2006] EWCA 1371 (Civ), 
at ¶ 8–49 (discussing challenges to application of exclusions and providing methodology 
for administrative and judicial application in future cases).  
276 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  
277 See id. at 960 n.22 (quoting brief of amicus Financial Services Industries). 
278 See id. at 960 n.23 (“[A]lthough invited to do so by several amici, we decline to 
adopt a broad exclusion over software or any other such category of subject matter 
beyond the exclusion of claims drawn to fundamental principles set forth by the Supreme 
Court.”). 
279 Id. at 952 (“But the Supreme Court has held that the meaning of ‘process’ as 
used in § 101 is narrower than its ordinary meaning.”). 
280 See id. at 954 (“A claimed process is surely patent-eligible under § 101 if: (1) it 
is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a 
different state or thing.”). 
281 Id. at 956 (anticipating future developments). 
282 For a vigorous argument against legal complexity in copyright law, see generally 
JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001) (surveying history of copyright legislation 
as business-to-business negotiations leading to ever more complex statutory provisions). 
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costs to master the more complex rules.283 At first glance, tailored rights 
would appear to be more complex and more administratively expensive than 
uniform rights. The working assumption for many lawyers appears to be that 
greater complexity in the law necessarily leads to greater administrative 
costs. This easy syllogism, however, is open to question because complexity 
does not necessarily equate with greater administrative costs.  
Where a proponent has shown that the risk of arbitrage can be minimized 
because legal terminology has relatively stable meanings, greater complexity 
may actually reduce licensing and litigation costs by creating better-tailored 
default rules. To the extent that one is persuaded by the Demsetz theory of 
property rights,284 one might agree. With intellectual property the Demsetz 
theory must admit a corollary which is that as the magnitude of identifiable 
deadweight loss caused by intellectual property rights increases, pressure will 
mount to greater specify rights so as to avoid those losses.285 This view 
might explain why the most arcane and complex portions of the Copyright 
Act, for example, are not the provisions over which most litigation resources 
are expended. The greater specificity may lead to less costly assessments of 
the value of particular transactions or disputes. Indeed, it is the effort to apply 
broad standards such as the idea/expression dichotomy or general standards 
embedded in the fair use doctrine that generate the uncertainty on which 
litigious impulses feed.286 To the extent that today’s meanings are 
destabilized by technological advance, greater industry-specificity may 
 
283 This analysis implicates—or is a species of—larger conversations about the 
choice between rules and standards or the optimal specificity of law. See, e.g., Colin S. 
Diver, Regulatory Precision, in MAKING REGULATORY POLICY 200 (K. Hawkins & J. 
Thomas eds., 1989); Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 
YALE L.J. 65, 65–66 (1984); see generally Francisco Parisi, Rules Versus Standards, in 2 
THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC CHOICE 510–15 (Charles K. Rowley & Friedrich 
Schneider eds., 2006) (summarizing traditional economic analysis of issue of optimal 
specificity). 
284 See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 
347, 350 (1967) (arguing that property rights emerge when the benefits of internalization 
are greater than administrative costs); see also Harold Demsetz, Frischmann’s View of 
“Toward a Theory of Property Rights”, 4 REV. L. & ECON. 127, 127 (2008) (response); 
Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1317–21 (1993) (surveying 
literature); Brett M. Frischmann, Evaluating the Demsetzian Trend in Copyright Law, 3 
REV. L. & ECON. 649, 652–53 (2007) (arguing against expansion of copyright as a means 
of internalizing all externalities).  
285 Cf. Smith, supra note 136, at 1789–90 (arguing that as information costs 
concerning uses governed by intellectual property rights fall, demand for greater 
specificity of rights will increase). 
286 See Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1085, 1098–1106 
(2007) (documenting fair use uncertainty and proposing administrative remedy). 
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actually facilitate better policymaking by forcing decisionmakers to confront 
the economics of the new technology.  
Nonetheless, concerns about greater administrative costs and legal 
arbitrage rightly counsel caution when analyzing the desirability of tailoring. 
These concerns also lead one to favor the more flexible approach of judicial 
tailoring when a desirable change in the law can be accomplished either 
judicially or legislatively. But some dimensions of the current rights structure 
can be altered only legislatively, and we should opt for this approach when 
the costs of uniformity are particularly high in a given context. 
C. Political Economy 
The framework proposed in Subsections V.A and V.B sketches a model 
for the respective legal and economic analyses of intellectual property rights 
as aspects of national innovation policy. Scholars can make their greatest 
contributions by gathering evidence and focusing analysis on the sources of 
uniformity cost and administratively feasible solutions. However, because the 
proposed framework is designed to be practical and effective, policymakers 
and advocates must also consider the question of political economy when 
assessing potential tailoring measures and the institutional form that they 
should take. 
As signaled at the opening of this Section, the question of comparative 
institutional analysis is a large one requiring book-length treatment.287 In 
their book, Professors Burk and Lemley strongly favor judicial tailoring over 
other institutional solutions.288 While I sympathize with their intuitions, for 
purposes of this framework, the institutional form of tailoring should remain 
flexible and be based on evidence of likely efficacy. Space allows room for 
only a few preliminary observations to defend this point. As Burk and 
Lemley’s analysis suggests, tailoring proposals are likely to hit their toughest 
sledding when faced with the political economy defense for uniformity. On 
balance, considerations of political economy support an argument that 
tailoring through judicial or administrative interpretation is more likely to 
succeed than legislative tailoring. That said, some specific responses to the 
reflexive argument that legislative tailoring will necessarily lead to greater 
inefficiency in intellectual property law need to be made. 
First, consider the special industry-specific deals encoded in Sections 
108–122 of the Copyright Act.289 It cannot be categorically stated that each 
of these measures makes the law less efficient than a law with strictly 
 
287 See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING 
INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1997). 
288 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 110, at 95–108. 
289 17 U.S.C. §§ 108–22 (2006). 
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uniform rights. On the contrary, a quick run through of the first two prongs of 
this framework suggests that many of these measures were drafted in 
response to arguments about market failure or other forms of what we now 
recognize to be uniformity cost and that even as enacted these either reduce 
uniformity cost or are simply superfluous. Perhaps the strongest example of a 
measure that reduces uniformity cost is the limit on copyrightability of useful 
articles in Section 113. In the absence of this limit, parties could readily 
evade the more stringent requirements of patentability and receive patent-like 
protection for articles that patent law would designate as part of the public 
domain. It is useful to note that this limit entered the law through judicial 
tailoring under the Copyright Act of 1909 and was subsequently ratified by 
Congress in the Copyright Act of 1976. 
Second, those who would argue that a legislative environment more 
conducive to special pleading by industry groups would increase the social 
costs of intellectual property rights must take full account of the evidence. 
Consider the extreme cases of those industries that have sought sui generis 
rights. The record indicates that in the United States in recent history they are 
two for four. The semiconductor chip industry received protection for mask 
works,290 and the boat manufacturers received a special deal in the wake of 
Bonito Boats.291 Neither of these deals appear to have imposed significant 
social costs, although the record on boat hulls is harder to parse. By contrast, 
the database industry is internally divided as is the fashion industry. These 
internal divisions have undermined their respective legislative campaigns for 
sui generis rights. These internal divisions reflect the realization that 
expanded intellectual property rights would impose significant private costs 
as well as social costs. 
As public choice theory suggests, the risk of an environment more 
conducive to special pleading is highest when expanded rights would 
increase private profits for the majority of industry players while increasing 
social cost. The fear that this will routinely be the case should be diminished 
by recognition that all information-intensive sectors treat information as both 
input and output. As long as a substantial subset of industry players is more 
concerned about access to inputs than control over outputs, the public choice 
risks associated with a more tailoring-friendly legislative environment are 
lower than advertised.292  
 
290 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 901–14 (2006). 
291 See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 168 (1989) 
(holding state law protection of boat hull designs preempted by federal law); 17 U.S.C. 
§ 130(a)(2) (2006) (granting federal sui generis protection to boat design features).  
292 Cf. Smith, supra note 136, at 1813–14 (recognizing that likely success of 
legislative tailoring initiative depends on specificity of uses governed by proposed 
measure). 
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Since overall the legislative record shows a trend toward expansion of 
the subject matter, scope, and duration of intellectual property rights 
resulting from consensus among information-intensive industry groups that 
greater control is worth more than easier access, the discipline argument 
must show that this trend would be steeper in a tailoring-friendly 
environment. As with the rest of the framework, arguments about the likely 
effects of political economy on any particular tailoring proposal or class of 
proposals should be based on evidence. Categorical dismissal of legislative 
tailoring as efficiency-promoting is not supported by the evidence. 
The reason to be skeptical about the likelihood that legislative tailoring 
will succeed is not so much that industry groups will more successfully seek 
rents, but that interest groups will be more successful than the courts at 
killing or diluting tailoring measures that would improve the efficiency of the 
law by constraining subject matter, scope, or duration. This is because the 
current subject matter, scope, and duration provisions of patent and copyright 
law indicate that most uniformity costs result from overprotection rather than 
underprotection. Starting from this statutory baseline, industry-specific 
legislative tailoring pursuant to the knowledge corollary would likely involve 
reducing protection for given industries. Some measures that would do so 
have been introduced into Congress, but they are given little hope of 
enactment. 
Unlike most commentators, I am less pessimistic about the long-term 
prospects for legislative tailoring. Heightened attention to the economic 
importance of intellectual property includes attention to the costs of 
intellectual property rights generally. In particular, the patent premium 
reflected in the prices of pharmaceutical drugs is of front-burner legislative 
interest. In addition, as the costs of intellectual property rights become more 
apparent, users and interested third parties who bear those costs will be more 
willing to pay the price for collective action. Finally, because valuable 
information is an input to the creation of other valuable information, 
industry-specific rent-seeking by one industry may well align the interests of 
other industries with consumers more generally, reducing the threat of 
successful overreaching. 
Because political economy raises particular risks for legislative tailoring, 
a more immediately attainable goal for using the knowledge corollary to 
reduce deadweight loss is to improve industry-specific tailoring in the courts. 
The most successful example of this kind of judicial response has been two 
aspects of copyright for software. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
When Justice Stephen Breyer was a young law professor, he made an 
unconventional choice for the topic of his tenure piece—copyright law.293 At 
the time, the dynamic field we now call “intellectual property” was not 
generally considered a unified field within American law schools, and its 
separate branches of copyright, patent, trademark, and trade secret were not 
generally considered subjects for keen interest among rising scholars. 
Anticipating the growth of the field, however, Breyer had chosen his topic in 
part because a decades-long legislative process to revise the Copyright Act 
appeared close to fruition. 
While Breyer’s contribution to a tradition of copyright skepticism294 
caused quite a stir at the time among lawyers for the copyright-dependent 
industries,295 Congress chose to proceed with the planned expansion of 
copyright. Breyer’s article offers a more lasting contribution in the form of a 
more general pragmatic, evidence-based approach to the economic analysis 
of intellectual property law. In particular, by analyzing the economics of 
book publishing, Breyer expressed unease about the need for copyright as a 
tool for encouraging dissemination of knowledge, and he argued from his 
data that arguments for the benefits of an expanded copyright law were 
largely unfounded. 
Using the emerging tools of economic analysis applied to law, Breyer 
summarized his “fairly comprehensive method for analyzing copyright 
problems,”296 by first reminding his critics that the justification for granting 
copyright rights cannot solely be that copiers have an economic advantage 
over initial producers because the copiers do not bear the costs of creating the 
work.297 Rather, he argued, one should first ask (1) what market-based 
advantages might creators have from which they can recoup the costs of 
creation; (2) does the government subsidize the costs of creation; and (3) 
might consumers find ways to channel funds to the creator to finance 
creation costs?298 The answers to these inquiries would set the baseline from 
which one would measure the marginal benefits that any level of copyright 
 
293 Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, 
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970). 
294 See, e.g., Arnold Plant, The Economic Aspects of Copyright in Books, 1 
ECONOMICA 167, 167–68 (1934). 
295 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL 
JUKEBOX 22–26 (1994) (describing the impact of Breyer’s article). 
296 See Stephen Breyer, Copyright: A Rejoinder, 20 UCLA L. REV. 75, 75 (1972). 
297 Id. at 75–76. 
298 Id. at 76. 
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rights might yield. Breyer continued that even when copyright rights might 
yield marginal benefits, policy makers must attend to the costs that copyright 
imposes, such as diminishing circulation and utilization of useful 
information.299 Subsequent economic analysis of intellectual property law 
has largely eschewed evidence-based analysis for more abstract modeling. 
However, as policy debates around intellectual property continue to intensify, 
and as abstract economic models offer little guidance about how to resolve 
these debates, Breyer’s methodological approach is ripe for revival. 
This Article builds on more recent learning from the economic analysis 
of intellectual property law to refine and extend Breyer’s approach. In 
particular, the framework proposed herein generalizes to incorporate both 
copyright and patent law within its scope and refines the empirical questions 
that should be asked and answered to improve intellectual property policy. 
One-size-fits-all patents and copyrights are necessarily inefficient even if one 
accounts for the various ways in which market measures, real options, and 
flexible standards can be used to reduce uniformity cost. Ultimately, 
intellectual property law still needs tailoring. Legislative distinctions between 
patents and copyrights reflects tailoring at a high level of abstraction, and 
these rights have been further tailored by Congress, the federal courts, the 
PTO, and the Copyright Office over time. This Article proposes a practical 
framework for analyzing the merits of existing and proposed tailoring 
measures. The framework focuses analysis on the relative abilities of 
government officials or private creators or innovators to pick winners in the 
innovative and creative fields of endeavor, the administrability of a particular 
policy, and the considerations of political economy that should influence any 
ultimate policy proposals. 
 
299 Id. 
